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 I 
Management Summary 
Currently, corporate crises are seen as an inevitability and an unavoidable part of the 
corporate life cycle. Therefore, the early recognition of crises has not been a focal point of 
business research in the past decades. The development of a conceptual framework would not 
only be beneficial for the company and the management, by predicting imminent crisis 
situations, but also for the employees, who would no longer be part of extreme downsizing 
campaigns. Therefore, the research hypothesis focused on challenging the existing consensus. 
By stating that a reliable framework would be able to prevent corporate turnarounds, the 
objective of this thesis was given.  
The created framework, consisting several analytical methods, including a multiple 
discriminant analysis and a logistic regression, was applied to several cases of corporate crises. 
The inclusion of companies operating in different industries in the analysis sample ensured the 
cross-industry predictive capabilities of the developed framework. The analysis relied on 
audited, publicly available financial information from annual reports. By focusing on the 
existing errors in crisis recognition, it was ensured that the developed framework creates added 
value for company executives. 
The application of the established framework unambiguously indicated that imminent 
corporate crises are clearly identifiable on average 2,25 years earlier than they have currently 
been. In some cases, the EWS model revealed the earliest symptoms more than four years before 
the crisis was recognized. Not only was confirmed that crises are predictable, but also that their 
early recognition can prevent corporate turnarounds. Furthermore, the application of the model 
allowed the creation of a condensed conceptual framework, which facilitates the overall 
application greatly.  
Overall, it was concluded that the created EWS model is a step forward regarding crisis 
recognition and possibly serves as the foundation for a more extensive framework in the future. 
By complementing the created model with qualitative factors, the cause-analysis of looming 
crises could be facilitated. Another way of improving on the conceptual framework would be 
the analysis of industry-specific scales, which would facilitate its interpretation. While it is 
recommended to focus on the implementation of industry-specific factors, as this would 
generate more value for mangers, the application of the model in a practical environment should 
be considered first. Such an application is anticipated to confirm the frameworks value in real-
life situations, which is crucial in order for it to be part of every manager’s toolbox. 
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 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
1 Introduction 
Recent headlines such as “Eastman Kodak files for bankruptcy” (De La Merced, 
2012), “All Toys R Us stores to close their doors” (BBC, 2018), “Alpiq is rehabilitated” 
(Müller, 2018) or “GM cutting 4,000 workers in latest round of restructuring” 
(Shepardson, 2019), show that corporate crises and turnaround management are 
omnipresent issues in contemporary media. Combined with the increasing number of 
corporate insolvencies (Pepels, 2015b) and widespread organizational decline (Panicker 
& Manimala, 2015), it is obvious why these subjects are also of abiding interest to 
researchers and managers alike (Marti, 2013; Schweizer & Nienhaus, 2017).  
Research reveals that the prevailing belief is that corporate crises are unavoidable 
and an inherent part of the corporate life cycle (Hofer, 1980; Lymbersky, 2011). 
Lymbersky (2011, p. 7) used the examples of Goldman Sachs and Chrysler to conclude 
that no company is immune against distress” and that “even the biggest and best can fall”. 
This aura of inevitability stems from managerial errors in recognizing the signs of 
looming crises (Collard, 2002; Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; McKinsey, 2014; Müller, 
2013; Pepels, 2015b; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The early warning signs are often 
misinterpreted or hushed because the management is unwilling to admit that their strategy 
is failing (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). As a result, it is often only intervened as soon as the 
liquidity, and therewith the continued existence of the company, is threatened (Slatter & 
Lovett, 1999). This sort of behavior is aptly described as the boiling frog syndrome, which 
is a phenomenon that could be immensely problematic since, without recognizing the 
severity of the situation, initiating a turnaround is impossible and the chances of 
preventing corporate failures are faint (Mc Kinsey, 2014).  
Not only are turnarounds extremely stressful processes (Faulhaber & Grabow, 
2009; Finkin, 1987; Marti, 2013), they also frequently result in PR disasters due to the 
radical downsizing associated with it (Slatter, Lovett & Barlow, 2006). Ad-hoc corrective 
measures, which usually divert personnel from routine tasks, and the use of external 
resources escalate the already considerable costs of the event (Lenahan, 1999). To make 
matters worse, despite considerable efforts and turnaround specialists obtaining control 
of the firm, many turnaround situations lead to bankruptcy and liquidation regardless 
(Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Therefore, it seems favorable for all types of organizations if 
corporate turnarounds could be averted, which is why this thesis aims to challenge the 
comprehensive consensus regarding the inevitability of corporate crises.  
 2 
 Introduction} 
1.1 Research Hypothesis and Objectives 
The proposed research hypothesis, which is loosely based on Faulhaber and 
Grabow (2009), is boldly couched to challenge the existing research status quo and 
provide ample food for thought. It will serve as the common theme of the thesis and 
subsequent evaluation of the framework. 
Corporate turnaround situations are predictable but a reliable framework 
for the timely recognition of such an event does not exist. Were managers 
able to grasp the severity of their circumstances in due time, major 
corporate turnarounds could be prevented. 
The hypothesis indicates that the aim of this paper is to establish a model of EWS 
that will enable managers to predict and prevent corporate turnaround situations. By 
applying an initial, more extensive framework, yielding from literature research, to 
several distinct case studies, its applicability should be tested. Furthermore, the case 
studies will illustrate which measures prove to be crucial for the early recognition and 
how they are related. The use of case examples from various industries, should ensure the 
cross-industry applicability of the model.  
More precisely, by creating an extensive framework of distinct EWS and applying 
it to organizational crises case studies, such as Alpiq or Under Armour, this paper aims 
to create a reliable cross-industry model for the early recognition of turnaround situations. 
The application of this framework will allow firms to predict looming turnarounds, 
determine the severity of the organization’s current circumstances, and plan corrective 
measures accordingly. By doing so, this thesis will contribute immensely to the study of 
corporate crises and their prevention, while simultaneously generating added value for 
firms willing to use the framework.  
In order to achieve this, this paper follows a distinct structure. First, the essential 
terms for the understanding of the subject matter will be defined. Afterwards, the state of 
the current research will be evaluated, and the underlying concepts will be introduced. In 
relation to those concepts, an extensive framework will be created, which will thereafter 
be examined regarding its suitability. Finally, the findings will be addressed, and the final 
framework will be presented. The conclusive highlighting of the analysis’ limitations will 
further contribute to the understanding of the developed conceptual model and indicate 
areas for future research.  
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1.2 Relevance of Subject Area 
For an attentive observer it seems peculiar how often the awareness that a 
company is in a crisis situation comes as a surprise (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Especially, 
since being aware of any prospective strategic or operative challenges belongs to the main 
remits of any manager. Research has found that, while sometimes the company lacks 
early warning systems (Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; Müller, 2013), most of the time the 
failure to recognize the severity of the situation is due to managerial (Collard, 2002; 
Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; McKinsey, 2014; Müller, 2013; Pepels, 2015b; Slatter & 
Lovett, 1999). Fear of acknowledging mistakes, excessive optimism or overestimating 
one’s competences has all been cited as possible reasons for this occurrence (Lymbersky, 
2013). Collard (2002, as cited by Lymbersky, 2013, p. 61) even claimed that “most […] 
managers [have not] learned to recognize the symptoms of oncoming illness in their 
business”, which makes their identification almost impossible.  
Unsurprisingly, it has generally been found that the causes of a crisis are 
identifiable long before its actual occurrence (Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; Müller, 2013; 
Situm, 2013; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The oversight of red flags prior to the turnaround 
situation leads to a self-enforcing downward spiral concluding in corporate failure 
(Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009). Since crises become progressively more severe with 
passing time, they are more easily resolved if detected early (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 
2004; Evertz & Krystek, 2014; Lymbersky, 2013; Müller, 2013). The greater the timespan 
between the first signs of impending trouble and actual recognition of the crisis, the more 
limited is the influence of managers on its outcome (Evertz & Krystek, 2014). If 
purposeful interventions are applied early enough, the traumas associated with crises can 
be evaded (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Consequently, as claimed by Birker (2015c), a 
turnaround should be initiated as soon as the first signs of distress become apparent, 
instead of when the crisis has become increasingly severe. 
Despite the practical significance of early crisis recognition, the subject had little 
attention devoted to it for decades (Birker, 2015d). It can be assumed that this is due to 
the notion that crisis management can be neglected with the presence of good corporate 
governance (Birker, 2015b). This thesis aims to rekindle the interest in this subject and 
add to the understanding of crisis prediction and prevention.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
In the theoretical framework, the most crucial terms for understanding turnaround 
management are defined first. The definitions are presented in logical order, from broad 
to specific, which should facilitate the comprehension of their connectedness. Less 
essential terms are briefly summarized in the Glossary (Chapter IV), where they are listed 
alphabetically. Afterwards, the underlying concepts of the subject are introduced and 
elucidated. 
2.1 Terminology 
2.1.1 Organizational Crises 
In their paper on Reframing Crisis Management, Pearson and Clair (1998) defined 
an organizational crisis as: 
[…] a low-profitability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of 
the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and 
means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made 
swiftly. (p. 60) 
In other words, a company may still generate profits while facing an 
organizational crisis, but corrections must be taken quickly in order remain profitable in 
the future. The cause of the crisis, as well as its way of resolution are uncertain, and time 
is of the essence. While this definition includes most of the essential characteristics of 
organizational crises, the definition used in this thesis further includes the limited duration 
(Birker, 2015b) and the uncertainty of the outcome (Birker, 2015b; Evertz & Krystek, 
2014). First, the limited duration is an essential part of an organizational crisis in regard 
to turnaround management, since it indicates the necessity for quick, purposeful 
management action. Furthermore, with increasing severity over time, the crisis cannot be 
prolonged indefinitely. Second, by initiating a corporate turnaround, the outcome of an 
organizational crisis can range from bankruptcy to a successful resolution resulting in an 
improved market position (Birker, 2015b; Evertz & Krystek, 2014). In addition, the 
outcome often serves as the basis for measuring turnaround success (Barker & Duhaime, 
1997; Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009), Consequently, both characteristics are decisive 
reasons for turnaround endeavors and should therefore be included in the definition of 
organizational crisis when addressing turnaround management. 
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2.1.2 Turnaround Situations 
Hofer (1980) vaguely defined a turnaround situation as an organizational state that 
includes a decline in profitability. However, it has since then been found that profitability 
alone is an unreliable indicator for the presence of turnaround situations, since huge 
investments could lead to decreasing profitability without the company facing a crisis 
(Lymbersky, 2013; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Additionally, profitability is not a meaningful 
signal because a loss in a single fiscal year may jeopardize one firm, while another can 
remain reasonably healthy (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Furthermore, a crisis-ridden 
company may still be profitable, as illustrated by Conergy, a solar company that increased 
its turnover by 33 percent but still experienced a cash flow crisis and was in dire need of 
a turnaround (Lymbersky, 2013). Based on this example, turnaround situations could be 
equated to the presence of a cash flow crisis, which would still be too simplistic, since a 
turnaround situation already exists before the firm faces a current liquidity crisis (Slatter 
& Lovett, 1999). Taking the aforementioned definition as a foundation, turnaround 
situations can be defined as such an advanced organizational crisis that the survival of the 
business is threatened. Slattter & Lovett (1999, p. 1) defined it as a state “[where a 
company’s] financial performance indicates that the firm will fail in the foreseeable future 
unless short-term corrective action is taken.” Panicker and Manimala (2015) described it 
more precisely as: 
A [situation] where a company suffers declining economic performance 
for an extended period of time, such that the performance level is so low 
that the survival of the company is threatened unless serious efforts are 
made to improve its performance. (p.22) 
Conclusively, it can be deduced that a turnaround situation occurs as soon as 
corporate survival is doubtful. Once such a state is apparent, corrective measures must be 
taken in order to salvage the company from bankruptcy (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Prior to 
this, the firm just faces a ‘normal’ organizational crisis, which not necessarily requires 
ad-hoc turnaround management practices. This definition is crucial because it allows the 
determination of a specific point in time, when a turnaround situation became apparent. 
Consequently, it allows this thesis to unambiguously define whether or not the application 
of the EWS framework warned of the imminent organizational decay prior to this distinct 
event.  
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2.1.3 Turnaround Management 
As soon as an organization regresses into a turnaround situation, long-term 
strategic planning recedes into the background, and ad-hoc management measures are 
employed to try to turn the situation around (Pepels, 2015a). This process is commonly 
recognized as turnaround management (Pepels, 2015a). More broadly, it includes all 
activities undertaken by an organization, in an existence-threatening state, to avert 
impending insolvency and return to sustainable profitability (Buschmann, 2006; Driendl, 
2012; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). In accordance with the previous definitions, it focuses on 
the rehabilitation of distressed companies and only occurs as soon as a turnaround 
situation is apparent and recognized by the management. Turnaround management differs 
greatly from daily business, as it usually is a compressed event, which features a high 
volume of work under drastic time constraints (Lenahan, 1999).  
Although there are slight distinctions, the term turnaround management is often 
used interchangeably with corporate transformation, crisis resolution, or revitalization 
(Platt, 1998). Hughes (1995), for instance, referred to GM Europe “[…] who turned life-
threatening losses into the highest profit level in the European automobile industry” 
(p.33), as an example of corporate reenergizing. Platt (1998) clearly identified corporate 
renewal as the hypernym, with crisis management, corporate transformation and 
turnaround management being its archetypes.  
2.1.4 Turnaround Success 
Since long-term strategic planning is not the highest priority during a corporate 
turnaround, concerns about the future and longevity of the company make way for the 
immediate objective of salvaging the firm from insolvency (Pepels, 2015a; Platt, 1998). 
According to Teerlink’s (2001) experience at Harley-Davidson, thinking about the future 
only starts as soon as the company has recovered. As a consequence, turnaround success 
is often reduced to the positive outcome of the initial process. By doing so, the application 
of methods such as cost-cutting, asset reduction or downsizing is reinforced, despite only 
leading to short-lived stabilization of the business (Slatter, Lovett & Barlow, 2006). 
Consequently, researchers have recognized the pitfalls to this being the sole measure of 
success and have directed the attention to the sustainability of turnaround endeavors 
(Barker III & Duhaime, 1997; Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004; Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; 
Slatter, Lovett & Barlow, 2006; Slatter & Lovett, 1999).  
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Barker III and Duhaime (1997) render a turnaround successful when a previously 
crisis-ridden organization is able to recover, end the threat to corporate viability and 
achieve sustained profitability. According to Faulhaber and Grabow (2009), a turnaround 
is successful as soon as the organizations is able to generate industry-customary returns 
for two consecutive years. Driendl (2012) claims that one or more fiscal periods yielding 
profits indicate a successful turnaround. Bickhoff and Eilenberger (2004) believe that four 
consecutive years of generating profits above industry benchmarks are necessary to show 
a successful strategic reorientation of the business, and therewith a sustainable 
turnaround.  
While there is disagreement regarding the definition of sustainability, it can 
overall be deduced that a successful turnaround not only includes the effective 
rehabilitation of the organization, but also the sustainable continuation of the business. In 
other words, a successful turnaround guarantees that the company fully recovers and is 
not expected to face another crisis in the foreseeable future (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). 
2.2 Literature Review 
While there has been a great variety of research into the area of corporate 
turnarounds, corporate renewal and turnaround management, the subject of early crisis 
recognition has not been a major focus of researchers in the past. The focus usually lied 
on either establishing a general approach and techniques for turnarounds (Slatter & 
Lovett, 1999; Platt, 1998) or addressing the topic from a more specific standpoint. Slatter, 
Lovett & Barlow (2006), for example, focused on the leadership behavior during 
turnarounds, whereas Driendl (2012) addressed turnarounds form a stock market 
perspective and showed how turnaround stocks can be extremely profitable. Others 
focused on the identification of distinct turnaround strategies, for example for small firms 
(Boyle & Desai, 1991), restaurants (Chathoth, Tse & Olsen, 2006), hospitals (Langabeer 
II, 2008), or industrial business units (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).  
The extensive literature review conducted for this thesis focuses on introducing 
the underlying key concepts of crisis behavior, crisis recognition and turnaround 
management. By doing so, the understanding of typical organizational crises can be 
fostered. The analysis of the common errors in crisis recognition ensures the practical 
suitability of the proposed EWS framework, whereas the following explanation of the 
existing instruments for crisis recognition, serves as the theoretical foundation of the 
techniques employed.  
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2.2.1 Crisis Development 
Slatter and Lovett (1999) have encapsulated the phases of crisis development in a 
four-stage model (Figure 1). This model is introduced because it aptly describes the 
evolution of a crisis from a company’s perspective. Furthermore, it illustrates why the 
internal recognition that a company is in trouble usually comes as a surprise. A firm 
typically follows the exact stages depicted on the left (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). However, 
the stages can be of varying duration, as, especially for fragile firms, the stages prior the 
collapse tend to be particularly short (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The corresponding 
organizational characteristics of each stage are shown on the right. The beginning of a 
turnaround situation, according to the definition in Chapter 2.1.2, is illustrated by the red 
line and begins as soon as the livelihood of the company is threatened.  
Initially, the symptoms of every crisis evolve in the hidden, away from the 
company’s knowledge. Only when the corporate performance is affected, the first 
symptoms become visible. Nonetheless, this negative development is often believed to be 
a short-term phenomenon and no corrective measures are deemed necessary. After further 
decay, the organizational collapse becomes increasingly likely and turnaround 
management is the only possible expedient. If the subsequent managerial interventions 
are not effective, the crisis will result in corporate failure.  
 
Figure 1: Four Stages of Crisis Development (adapted from Slatter & Lovett, 1999) 
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Hidden Crisis: Due to a lack of reliable control systems, the organization’s 
executives are unaware of the existence of a crisis (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The 
organizational climate is characterized by complacency and arrogance about their market 
position and capabilities (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Organizational complacency leads to a 
feeling of immunity regarding crises (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
Crisis Denial: The management team tries to link the symptoms to chance or 
positive organizational change and the situation is believed to improve in due time (Slatter 
& Lovett, 1999). The bad situation is often thought to be caused by uncontrollable short-
term external pressures (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Overall, no management action is 
deemed necessary, since “[optimism] about the future is still the prevailing management 
rhetoric” (Slatter & Lovett, 1999, p. 62). 
Disintegration of organization: As the situation worsens, the existence of the 
crisis and the subsequent need for management action is recognized but still 
underestimated (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Consequently, the actions taken, such as budget 
cuts, only manage to delay the corporate decay (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Inflexibility and 
a drive for self-preservation lead to increased autocracy and ostracism of colleagues 
advocating an alternative point of view (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Overall, the published 
press reports still remain optimistic (Slatter & Lovett 1999). 
Organizational collapse: It becomes evident that the current management is 
unable to cope with the crisis (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The expectation of failure grows, 
competent people resign, and organizational morale falls (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Only 
a rigorous focus on turnaround management, often combined with the recruitment of 
turnaround specialist, may avert the impending insolvency (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). 
The key takeaway from this model is that organizational crises are triggered long 
before their occurrence is recognized within the company (Situm, 2013). In other words, 
“[…] a severe crisis does not occur overnight” (Slatter & Lovett, 1999, p. 61). Hence, an 
attentive observer should be able to recognize the accumulation of indicative sigs ahead 
of corporate crises (Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; Situm 2013; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). The 
failure of recognition is often coupled with the stressful nature of admitting that there is 
a problem and acknowledging management mistakes (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). 
Furthermore, since symptoms manifest themselves early and management optimism 
prevails thereafter, the crises usually proves to be worse than it was initially expected to 
be (Slatter & Lovett, 1999).   
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2.2.2 Crisis Types and Behavior 
Initially, Andrade and Kaplan (1997) only distinguished between two crisis types, 
namely financial and economic distress. While the former is defined as having excessive 
debt, the latter included industry, operating and macroeconomic trouble (Platt, 1998). 
However, more recently, researchers have focused on including the measurement of time 
into the definition of crisis types (Evertz & Krystek, 2014; Müller, 2013). Consequently, 
three corresponding aggregate states that progress over time have been determined: 
potential, latent and acute (Evertz & Krystek, 2014). Those three states correspond with 
the three development stages prior to the organizational collapse depicted in Figure 1. 
During the potential state, the crisis symptoms are mostly hidden but become more 
obvious the more the crisis progresses. The disintegration of the company slowly begins 
once the latent state is reached and further accelerates in the final stage. The turnaround 
situation begins as soon as the survival of the company is threatened and shortly 
thereafter, organizational collapse is impending.  
If the seriousness of the crisis is taken into consideration, three types of 
organizational crises – strategy crisis, earnings crisis and liquidity crisis – can be 
determined (Figure 2). All crises, apart from some exceptions, follow the same pattern 
and initially emerge as sole strategy crises, before they further evolve into earnings and 
liquidity crises (Müller, 2013). In individual cases, such as the default on receivables from 
a major customer, a company could directly reach the ultimate stage (Kraus & Haghani, 
2004). Figure 2 depicts that the crisis types are equivalent to the three aggregate states, in 
terms of chronological progression, but differ regarding their severity. A strategy crisis is 
considerably less serious than an earnings or liquidity crisis and thus accompanied by less 
obvious signs. The more a crisis is allowed to deteriorate, the more severe it gets and the 
more obvious the warning signs become. This is illustrated by the grey arrows, which 
show the order of emergence, and the orange arrows, which show the order of recognition. 
Consequently, despite the presence of early crisis indicators, crises are usually not 
acknowledged until the liquidity of the company is endangered (Müller, 2013). It can be 
recognized that, since the crisis types are continuous progressions, solely tackling the 
causes of the most recent type will not guarantee the longevity of the organization. 
Therefore, once the presence of a liquidity crisis is acknowledged, the causes for the 
earlier crisis types need to be detected. This step is essential because more business areas 
become affected with the continuous development of the crisis (Lymbersky, 2013). The 
red line indicates the beginning of a turnaround situation with an ambiguous outcome. 
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Figure 2: Emergence and Recognition of Organizational Crises (adapted from Bichkoff & 
Eilenberger, 2004; Evertz & Krystek, 2014; Müller. 2013) 
During the acute state, a crisis could become non-controllable. However, if the 
crisis is correctly identified, corporate recovery is always possible prior to reaching the 
non-controllable state (Figure 3). The red line in the figure indicates the turning point 
where a turnaround becomes impossible. If Figure 2 and Figure 3 are combined, it can be 
recognized that, since the situation becomes progressively more serious and the 
profitability plummets, a successful turnaround is increasingly less likely, the further 
advanced the stage is upon recognition. Therefore, it can be determined that that 
organizational crisis follow the principle of ‘the earlier recognized, the easier rectified’, 
which reinforces the importance of a reliable EWS framework in business management. 
 
Figure 3: Possibility of Corporate Recovery (adapted from Birker, 2015d; Fæste, Schönfelder, 
Gruß & Lay, 2016)  
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2.2.3 Recognition of Crises 
As previously found, the moment of recognition is decisive for the crisis outcome. 
Prior to its occurrence, a crisis is indicated by obvious or ambiguous signals, which are 
often overlooked (Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009). The further a crisis is allowed to 
deteriorate, the smaller is the chance of a successful turnaround (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 
2004). Consequently, this section introduces some general symptoms of corporate crises, 
as well as the most prominent indicators of each specific crisis type. By drawing upon the 
warning signs, an attentive manager should be enabled to objectively assess the situation 
and interfere if necessary. According to Slatter and Lovett (1999) as well as Müller (2013) 
the general indicators of corporate decay and looming crises are: 
 Poor financial results and creative accounting 
 Profit warning and declining performance 
 Declining market share 
 A potential takeover bid 
 Rapid management turnover 
 Recurring failure of product launches 
 Reliance on big projects 
 Quality problems and declining customer service 
A more precise analysis reveals that several crisis symptoms can be specifically 
linked to the crisis types depicted in Figure 2. Therefore, the recognition of earlier crisis 
stages can be facilitated.  
Strategy crisis: A strategy crisis is usually indicated by the worsening of a 
company’s competitive position (Kraus & Haghani, 2004). The primary indicators of it 
are missing long-term success potentials and strategic goals (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 
2004). Due to the nature of the indicators, this crisis type is often only preceded by weak 
signals and the operative business of the company is usually not yet affected (Kraus & 
Haghani, 2004). However, after some time has passed, one, or several, business segments 
begin to be affected to such an extent that it can be recognized in the operative 
environment (Bickhoff & Eilenberber, 2004). If this is the case, it can typically be 
identified by unplanned declines in sales causing an accumulation of inventories and an 
increase in debt financing (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004). Despite this, a company may 
still generate profits while being in a strategic crisis (Lymbersky, 2013).   
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Earnings crisis: If the causes of a crisis are not tackled in the first stage, it is only 
a matter of time until the earnings situation of the company begins to be affected (Kraus 
& Haghani, 2004). Consequently, this crisis type is characterized by companies initially 
generating below industry-average profits, then forfeiting profit goals and finally 
beginning to incur net losses (Haghani, 2004; Kraus & Haghani, 2004). These losses can 
impact the equity capital of the company to such an extent that over-indebtedness is 
possible (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004). Combined with the increased debt financing, 
resulting from the strategic crisis, a company’s credit rating could decline, which would 
escalate the costs of future borrowings (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004).  
Liquidity crisis: Again, if the crisis is not resolved, it deteriorates even further 
until the equity of the company is depleted (Haghani, 2004). This crisis manifests itself 
either in imminent or acute insolvency (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004). The seriousness 
of a liquidity crisis can be exacerbated by the interplay of external factors such as imposed 
restrictions on future borrowing (Bickhoff & Eilenberger, 2004).  
Müller (2013) found that each crisis type affects specific areas of the income and 
cashflow statements (Figure 4). By establishing a direct connection between the fiscal 
results of the company and crisis indicators, early recognition can be simplified. This 
connection enables managers to monitor specific indicators that possibly reveal a 
downward trend before the crisis is apparent. As visible in Figure 4, strategy crises are 
reflected in sales revenue and contribution margin decreases, while earnings crises affect 
earnings figures directly. Finally, liquidity crises would manifest themselves in the 
company’s cash flow statement.  
 
Figure 4: Recognition of Crises Types in Financial Statements  
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2.2.4 Errors in Crisis Recognition 
Despite the existence of indicators, the early recognition of crises is an intricate 
management task (Müller, 2013). The difficulty, specifically in recognizing earlier crisis 
development stages, lies in distinguishing between chance or negative trend (Müller, 
2013). Since strategy crises, in particular, are usually only announced by weak signals, it 
often is a mixture of detailed analysis and gut feeling to correctly determine whether the 
signals are random or reveal a downward trend (Müller, 2013). Since, as aforementioned, 
optimism often prevails in early crisis stages, changes in indicators are commonly 
attributed to random events, and managers frequently fail to acknowledge the red flags in 
advance (Collard, 2002; Faulhaber & Grabow, 2009; McKinsey, 2014; Müller, 2013; 
Pepels, 2015b). Consequently, this chapter addresses the most common errors that occur 
in crisis recognition, in order to ensure the validity of the later created framework. 
In general, it has been found, based on examples of unnoticed crisis, that the 
failure to acknowledge crisis situations can be ascribed to one or several of six common 
factors (Müller, 2013). All these factors, according to Müller (2013), are briefly 
introduced below. 
1. Failure to identify the crisis: The failure to correctly identify a worsening 
situation as an organizational crisis is the most common reason that crises are 
recognized too late. As aforementioned, this is often due to misidentifying a 
negative development as a random event (Müller, 2013). If the crisis fails to 
be correctly identified, no corrective measures can be taken to tackle the 
causes at an early stage. The failure of recognition is common for strategy 
crises, since this type is only foreshadowed by weak signals (Kraus & 
Haghani, 2004).  
2. Inexistence of an EWS framework: The second most common reason is that 
no framework for the early recognition is employed within the company. It is 
obvious that the inexistence of such a framework makes the early recognition 
of crisis nearly impossible, as no set of rules is in place to help anticipate 
imminent crisis situations. Also, Faulhaber and Grabow (2009) found that the 
absence of EWS is frequently the decisive factor for failing to recognize an 
organizational crisis.  
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3. Failure to take action: As addressed in Chapter 2.2.1, the crisis is usually 
denied and believed to be evanescent, which leads to the management failing 
to initiate corrective measures at an early stage (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). 
Although the deteriorating situation is recognized, the signs are often ignored 
and excessive optimism regarding the company’s future projects hinders 
management intervention (Slatter & Lovett, 1999).  
4. Failure to take responsibility: Müller (2013) found that the management 
sometimes escapes the unpleasant fact that a crisis is apparent by focusing on 
the daily business, rather than targeting the worsening situation. Furthermore, 
the person in power begins to delegate challenging tasks, which is seen as a 
flight from responsibility.  
5. Failure to tackle the issue: Similar to number four, the management fails to 
tackle the issue by sticking to existing patters. However rather than justifying 
this action by heavily focusing on the daily business, it is attributed to the 
corporate mentality. In such cases, a ‘we-have-always-done-it-this-way’ 
mentality prevents the optimization of business processes in order to resolve 
the crisis.  
6. Failure to communicate the crisis accordingly: The final reason for failing 
to acknowledge crisis situations is that the existence of the crisis is hushed or 
miscommunicated. It can be assumed that this stems from the fear of taking 
responsibility for one’s own mistakes, especially in companies where crises 
are commonly believed to be the result of individual errors (Faulhaber & 
Grabow, 2009; Slatter & Lovett, 1999). As a result of the vague 
communication, the company lacks direction in tackling the crisis 
accordingly. 
Slatter and Lovett (1999) found that after the existence of a crisis is 
acknowledged, the distinction between its symptoms and root causes is decisive for 
recovery or failure. This is because “[although] symptoms give clues to what might be 
wrong with the firm, […] they do not provide a guideline for management action” (Slatter 
& Lovett, 1999, p. 13). Consequently, it is essential that the root causes of the 
organizational crisis can be determined. For example, since crisis are usually only 
acknowledged in the last stage, the symptoms are shown in the liquidity issues of the firm. 
However, were the company to only tackle the liquidity issues by focusing on corporate 
restructuring, a turnaround would not be sustainable, because the causes of the strategy 
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crisis would not be resolved. As a result, the organization can be expected to plummet 
into another crisis situation shortly after resolving the liquidity issues (Slatter, Lovett & 
Barlow, 2006). Furthermore, since more business areas are affected in later crisis stages, 
a detailed investigation to find causes is crucial, because they may result from another 
department than the one where the symptoms became visible (Lymbersky, 2013). 
Consequently, the cause analysis could be delayed or even prevented by the existence of 
a silo mentality within the organization (Birker, 2015d). In such circumstances, the 
investigation could be interpreted as an act of scapegoating rather than a constructive 
analysis, which could lead to a potential failure to correctly identify the root causes of the 
corporate decay (Birker, 2015d).  
Conclusively, the creation of an EWS framework directly tackles the two most 
prominent issues in crisis recognition. While it will not be able to support the cause 
analysis without including qualitative measurements, a solely qualitative framework 
would still be immensely beneficial. Müller (2013), for example, concluded that a reliable 
set of indicators, allowing the early detection of irregularities, is extremely sought-after. 
By also enabling the board of directors to use the framework, instead of just relying on 
information from the executive management, an independent analysis could be conducted 
in order to establish a second opinion regarding the severity of the crisis. By doing so, the 
other errors in crisis recognition could be tackled and previously unnoticed corporate 
declines can be recognized. 
2.2.5 Instruments for Early Crisis Recognition 
Since there are more action alternatives in the earlier stages, the possibility of a 
successful turnaround is far greater, if the crisis is recognized in due time (Briker, 2015d). 
Consequently, this section introduces the existing body of knowledge regarding 
instrument for early crisis recognition. The strengths and weaknesses of the most common 
tools – financial ratios, discriminant analyses and logit models (Zopounidis & Doumpos, 
1999) – are highlighted in the course of this chapter. Some of these analytical tools, 
namely the discriminant analysis of the logit model, have not specifically been used as 
instruments for early crisis recognition before, but rather for the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcies. However, since crises develop in chronological order and insolvency is the 
final stage, this thesis argues that both tools could also be used to predict looming crisis 
situations. By monitoring the changes in the scores prior to the crisis occurrence, it is 
expected that the symptoms of a looming organizational decay are already observable and 
that the use of the tools can be extended to the early recognition of crises.  
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Financial ratios: Due to their high availability and relevance in business failure 
prediction, financial ratios are frequently used crisis indicators (Platt, 1998; Situm, 2013; 
Zopounidis and Doumpos, 1999). Overall, Situm (2013) found that monitoring changes 
in a company’s financial figures can enable an early identification of problem areas and 
consequently warn of the impending insolvency. However, on their own, the ratios solely 
allow managers to determine the symptoms, not the causes, of organizational crises 
(Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999). Since the crisis is usually recognized when the liquidity 
is endangered, it is extremely likely that the symptoms occur in another business area 
than the one where the crisis originated. Therefore, it is crucial that if a ratio analysis is 
used, managers further investigate the symptoms in order to find the causes and introduce 
appropriate corrective measures. The main caveat of the application of this method is that 
symptoms and root causes are frequently confused (Birker, 2015d; Slatter & Lovett, 
1999). Failure to correctly identify the causes of crises or the misidentification of 
symptoms as causes, could lead to misdirected corrective measures, which ultimately are 
unable to salvage the firm from bankruptcy. In order to determine the causes, qualitative 
variables, such as the structure of the firm, the quality of the management and market 
trends, should be taken into consideration (Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999).  
The main drawback of this method, regarding external analysts, is that financial 
statements could be subject to creative accounting, and thus provide a distorted picture of 
the company’s accounts and the severity of the crisis. This risk can be mitigated by relying 
on data from annually prepared statements, since such statements are audited and hence 
provide are more truthful view (Platt, 1998). Regardless, companies in financial distress 
may still succumb to creative accounting practices (Platt, 1998), which is shown by the 
prominent examples of Enron or Parmalat. In addition, there is a high possibility that there 
is a time lag between the internal occurrence and external recognition of the crisis as 
audited financial reports are published annually (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). Lastly, since 
the annual reports show one specific moment in time and declaration standards differ, the 
data could be distorted. Despite this obvious drawbacks, financial ratio analyses are 
commonly employed due to the lack of internal information available to outsiders 
(Dambolena & Khoury, 1980; Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999). 
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Discriminant analysis (Z-score): A multiple discriminant analysis is a statistical 
approach that classifies an observation into groups dependent upon individual 
characteristics (Altman, 1968). It is primarily used to classify or make predictions 
between qualitative variables such as male/female or bankrupt/non-bankrupt (Altman, 
1968). While it initially has been used in biological or behavioral sciences it has become 
a common tool to assess financial problems (Altman, 1968). Altman (1968) pioneered the 
use of financial ratios and discriminant analyses as a means of corporate bankruptcy 
prediction. The ultimate goal of his multicriteria model is to discriminate between 
bankrupt and healthy firms (Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999). Moreover, a grey area was 
determined, which indicates an uncertain position and the need for further investigation 
(Zopounidis & Doumpos, 1999). The result of the analysis yields a score, known as the 
Z-score or Z value, which consist of the sum of products between variables and constants 
(Altman, 1968). The variables are specific financial ratios that have been found to be 
reliable indicators of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). Since the calculations also rely on 
published financial data, the same disadvantages as for financial ratios apply. The main 
advantage of multiple discriminant analyses is that an entire profile of characteristics and 
their interaction can be considered (Altman, 1968).  
Logit model: This classification method is also based on financial ratios but, 
unlike Altman’s (1968) Z-score, its foundation is a logistic regression (Situm, 2013). In 
statistical analysis, regression models are used to explain the underlying pattern between 
the relationship of variables (Waters, 2011). Since the model also uses financial ratios, 
the same disadvantages regarding publicly available financial data apply. The logit model 
is one of the main alternatives to Altman’s (1968) discriminant analysis and overcomes 
some of its limitations (Doumpos & Zopounidis, 1999; Situm, 2013). The most prominent 
advantage is that it indicates a company’s probability of financial health (Situm, 2013). 
In other words, were a company to achieve a score of 82 percent, it shows that the firm 
has an 82 percent probability to be in a healthy financial situation. 
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3 Methodology 
The methodology demonstrates how the hypothesis is examined based on the tools 
outlined in the theoretical framework. First, it elucidates how the techniques are applied 
and how they may be interpreted. Afterwards, it addresses how those techniques are 
compiled in a broad EWS framework that will later be applied to selected organizational 
case studies. By showing how the case studies were selected, the goals of the framework 
are reinforced, and transparency is created. Finally, this chapter is concluded in a 
conceptual framework, which illustrates how the parts are interlinked and how each 
contributes to answering the prosed research hypothesis. 
3.1 Analytical Methods 
3.1.1 Financial Ratios 
The ratios used in the subsequent analysis have been selected based on their ability 
to predict crisis situations and their prominent use in past research. Table 5 in Appendix 
I shows how often specific ratios for crisis prediction have been used by researchers in 
order to determine signs of looming distress. The selected ratios have been summarized 
in Table 1 and were, with the exception of the quick ratio and ROE, used by more than 
one third of the sources analyzed. The ROE has been specifically taken into consideration 
because of its ability to illustrate the impact of debt on the generated return when 
compared with the ROA (Leach, 2010). The quick ratio has been added to the analysis 
due to its capability to quantify the impact of an accumulation of inventions on a firm’s 
ability to cover all its short-term liabilities (Leach, 2010). However, financial ratios by 
themselves are meaningless if not contrasted historic company figures or industry 
averages in order to be interpreted correctly (Leach, 2010).  
Table 1: Selected Financial Ratios 
Ratio Category 
Working capital turnover Activity ratio 
Cash flow to debt ratio Coverage ratio 
Debt ratio Leverage ratio 
Current ratio Liquidity ratio 
Quick ratio Liquidity ratio 
ROA Profitability ratio 
ROE Profitability ratio 
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Activity ratios, such as the working capital turnover, compare sales revenue with 
a company’s assets in order to quantify its efficiency (Platt, 1998). As shown by the 
formula, the working capital turnover measures how efficiently a company’s working 
capital is employed to generate sales. If the ratio decreases from one fiscal period to 
another, it indicates that the firm’s working capital is used increasingly less efficiently. A 
lower ratio could possibly indicate an accumulation of inventories. 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 =  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
Coverage ratios measure the ability of a firm to cover a given expense (Atrill, 
2006). In the case of the cash flow to debt ratio, a firm’s operating cash flow is compared 
to the total liabilities and it is evaluated to what extent the cash flow covers the debt 
(Atrill, 2006). If the ratio, for example, is 0,20, then 20 percent of the company’s debt are 
covered by the operating cash flow. If the score is above 1, the company has a higher 
operating cash flow than liabilities. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
 
Leverage ratios calculate a firm’s level of indebtedness by comparing its debt to 
its assets (Platt, 1998). More precisely, the debt ratio contrasts the total debt with the total 
assets in order to determine the “[…] proportion of invested funds raised from debt 
holders” (Platt, 1998, p. 78). Consequently, if the ratio is above 1, more assets are 
financed by debt and the company bears a higher financial risk (Kenton & Hayes, 2019). 
This means that lower debt ratios are more desirable as they are linked to a less risky 
business. 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Liquidity ratios provide insights regarding the solvency of the firm (Platt, 1998). 
Such ratios assess how likely it is for a company to continue trading in the foreseeable 
future (Leach, 2010). This thesis uses the current and the quick ratio, since a comparison 
of both not only evaluates the liquidity, but also specifically assesses a company’s 
inventory development. An explicit focus on inventories is crucial, since their value can 
be subject to quick deterioration (Platt, 1998). Furthermore, inventories cannot be turned 
into cash as quickly as quick assets, since they need to be sold first (Leach, 2010). Both 
criteria combined show that the quick ratio serves as a more conservative, more stringent 
and more realistic measure of a firm’s short-term ability to cover the claims of its creditors 
(Atrill, 2006). If the result of either ratio is 1, it shows that, were the evaluated assets to 
be liquidated at book value, the company would have enough funds to repay its creditors 
(Platt, 1998). Platt (1998) found that a current ratio of 2 indicates financial health, since 
the creditors could be repaid twice. A quick ratio of 1 is sufficient to label a business 
financially stable (Leach, 2010). Regardless, in practice a quick ratio below 1 does not 
necessarily indicate liquidity problems (Atrill, 2006). 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
 
Profitability ratios, such as ROA or ROE, compare profits with returns or 
investments (Platt, 1998). The ROE shows how much profit is generated for each dollar 
the shareholders invested in the firm, whereas the ROA quantifies the profits generated 
in regard to the assets used (Leach, 2010). Both figures need to be evaluated in the context 
of the industry the company is active in, but in general, higher ROE or ROA figures are 
more desirable (Leach, 2010). The major drawback of profitability ratios is that, despite 
showing that there are problems within the firm, they do not provide any insights into 
what could be wrong (Platt, 1998). 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟ᇱ𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
  
 22 
 Methodology} 
3.1.2 Z-Score 
As previously addressed, the discriminant analysis was introduced by Altman 
(1968) in order to distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. Altman (1968) 
selected the ratios based on their statistical significance, inter-correlations and predictive 
accuracy. Since Altman (1968) calculated the variables as percentages, this thesis uses 
the calculation introduced by Slatter and Lovett (1999, p. 15), which has been adjusted to 
the use of ratio results in decimals.  
𝑍 = (1.2𝑋ଵ) + (1.4𝑋ଶ) + (3.3𝑋ଷ) + (0.66𝑋ସ) + (1.0𝑋ହ) 
 
𝑋ଵ =
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
      𝑋ଶ =
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
      𝑋ଷ =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
𝑋ସ =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
       𝑋ହ =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
According to Altman (1968), a company is financially healthy if it scores above 
2,67, whereas it can be classified as bankrupt, if the score lies below 1,81. In between 
both scores, there is the so-called grey area, or zone of ignorance, which shows that the 
firm is in a temporarily sick position (Altman, 1968). Slatter and Lovett (1999) found that 
if score falls below 0, and no corrective action is taken, the company will be bankrupt 
within two years.  
This thesis applies Altman’s (1968) multiple discriminant analysis in order to 
predict corporate turnaround situations. It is argued, that negative changes in the Z-value 
reflect underlying problems within the organization and thus warn of imminent crisis 
situations, even if the score still lies far above 2,67. More precisely, if the score, for 
instance, drops from 10 to 7,5 within one fiscal period, it can be seen as an early indicator 
for a potential crisis. By monitoring these changes prior to corporate crises, it is expected 
that decreases in this score show the deteriorating situation far ahead of the crisis being 
reflected in the liquidity situation of the firm. Consequently, Altman’s (1968) multiple 
discriminant analysis is believed to be one of the most crucial tools in the created EWS 
framework.  
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3.1.3 Logit Model 
Similar to the multiple discriminant analysis, the logit analysis is based on several 
financial ratios. However, as the ratios are different to the ones used in Altman’s (1968) 
Z-score, the logit analysis adds additional value to the EWS framework. Another 
distinction is that some variables are allocated vastly higher multipliers than others, which 
indicates their comparable importance (Situm, 2013). The logistic regression is calculated 
as follows (Situm, 2013, p. 285):  
𝐹 =  
1
(1 + 𝑒ି(ଵଷ.଻଼ଵଷିସ.଻ଶହଶ௑భାହଶ.ଽ଻ସଵ௑మିଷ.଴ହଽସ యିଵସ.ହହ଼௑రା଴.ଵ଼଼଺ ఱ))
 
 
𝑋ଵ =
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
      𝑋ଶ =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
      𝑋ଷ =
𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝑋ସ =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
       𝑋ହ =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Since the logit model is able to show the probability of financial health for a 
company (Situm, 2013), this calculation is used in order to indicate the beginning of a 
turnaround situation in the subsequent case study analyses. As soon as the logit score falls 
below 78 percent, a firm can be considered financially stricken (Situm, 2013). Therefore, 
this thesis argues that if the score descends below the cut-off probability of 78 percent, 
the liquidity of a company is endangered, and a turnaround situation is apparent. The 
implication of this assumption is that, if the EWS framework is able to show a significant 
deterioration of the company’s position prior to the logit score dropping below the healthy 
limit, early crisis recognition could be ensured. 
3.2 Broad EWS Model 
The aim of early warnings systems is to gain more time for countermeasures by 
continuously monitoring several crisis indicators that seek to reveal deteriorating 
organizational trends at an early stage (Pepels, 2015a). In order to do this, the 
development of crisis-relevant key figures is evaluated, and as long as the assessed figures 
do not significantly deviate from the target values no corrective action is deemed 
necessary (Pepels, 2015a). However, if there are considerable deviations, it possibly 
indicates the advent of a crisis situation and the developments should be subject to an 
extensive investigation.  
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The broad EWS framework, created for the analysis of the case studies, consists 
of the specific ratio analyses, Altman’s (1968) discriminate model and Doumpos and 
Zopounidis’ (1999) logistic regression. The framework will be applied to several 
corporate case studies and is tested on its predictive abilities. The analysis will consist of 
a thorough evaluation of the specific companies’ financial performance over various 
fiscal periods. The results will be displayed in a radar chart, where the changes in each 
measurement can be traced and interpreted (Figure 5). The example radar scale shows 
how the findings will be presented. The figures will be interpreted based on the changes 
in each measurement and the predictive ability of the different measurements are 
assessed. By doing so, the final framework can be condensed to the few most decisive 
measurements in order to facilitate its application.  
The radar chart will be interpreted on the basis of the changes in the assessed 
years. A positive movement on the radar scale can be interpreted as an improvement, 
whereas and a negative development depicts a deterioration of the current situation. Since 
not the firm’s position within the industry, but rather the change in each measurement is 
examined, the scores are not interpreted regarding the respective industry average. More 
precisely, it is not assessed whether a ROA of 15 percent reflects an advantageous market 
position for a particular company, but whether the score has decreased in regard to the 
previous years and what the possible corresponding implications are.  
 
Figure 5: Example Radar Chart 
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Since all employed tools yield a different result that can only be interpreted on its 
specific scale, all figures need to be converted to a single scale in order to be compared 
to one another. Therefore, this thesis first determined the acceptable ranges for each ratio 
and converted those to a single 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is the lowest (worst) and 10 the 
highest (best) score. The acceptable ranges are based on the highest and lowest scores in 
the respective ratio across all case studies, which are adjusted if the scores are deemed 
outliers (see Figure 6: Scale Determinants in Appendix II). Such an adjustment has, for 
instance, been done regarding the ROE scores, where a bottom score of negative 228 
percent is seen as an exception. In such cases, where the score exceeds the set range, they 
will be fixed on either lowest or highest range score respectively, in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results.  
Table 3 shows the comparison of the actual ratio scales to the scale used in the 
radar chart. In order to convert the figures to the radar scale, a conversion function for 
each specific measurement was established (Table 2). In Table 2, the variable X1 stand 
for the initial ratio result, whereas X2 shows the results on the radar scale. Therefore, if 
the working capital turnover, for example, was 4,0 for any case study, the score shown 
on the ratio scale would be 5,8, as given by its specific scale conversion function.  
Table 2: Formulas for Conversion to Radar Scale 
Ratio Scale conversion function  
Working capital turnover 
𝑥ଶ =
(𝑥ଵ + 25)
5
 
Cash flow to debt ratio 
𝑥ଶ =
(𝑥ଵ + 0,5)
0,2
 
Debt ratio 
𝑥ଶ =
(𝑥ଵ − 1,5)
−0,15
 
Current ratio 𝑥ଶ = 2𝑥ଵ 
Quick ratio 𝑥ଶ = 2𝑥ଵ 
ROA 
𝑥ଶ =
(𝑥ଵ + 20)
6
 
ROE 
𝑥ଶ =
(𝑥ଵ + 20)
6
 
Z-score 𝑥ଶ = 𝑥ଵ 
Logit model 𝑥ଶ =
𝑥ଵ
10
× 100 
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Table 3: Scale Conversion for Each Measurement 
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3.3 Case Studies 
Although every organizational crisis is specific to the organization, the use of past 
examples allows insights into the understanding of crises overall (Birker, 2015d). 
Consequently, this thesis analyses several cases of specific crises in order to evaluate the 
proposed hypothesis. By using several examples of past corporate crises, it can be 
evaluated to what extent the established framework is able to reliably predict 
organizational crises. Therefore, its practical suitability can be assessed. The results will 
either prove or disprove the proposed research hypothesis. Furthermore, the case studies 
are expected to illustrate how the applied measurements are interlinked and which of these 
are more decisive in predicting turnaround situations. As a result, the analysis should 
yield a more concise framework, consisting of the most meaningful measurements, which 
should facilitate its application. 
The main criteria for selecting the case studies were the presence of a corporate 
crisis, the availability of financial information as well as the inclusion of various 
industries. First, in order to analyze the framework’s ability to predict organizational 
crises, the presence of such crises in the sample used is a necessity. Second, based on the 
nature of the analysis employed, the availability of financial information in the form of 
annual reports is crucial. By analyzing companies operating in various industries, the 
cross-industry applicability of the framework can be examined. Were the case studies to 
show distinct similarities, it could be assumed that cross-industry applicability is given. 
Based on the selection principles, the sample was limited to public companies, since the 
analysis heavily relies on the accessibility of financial information. Furthermore, since 
historic financial statements are not always available, the sample focuses on more recent 
examples. Therefore, potential cases such as The LEGO Group (private company) or Fiat 
Automobiles and General Motors (absence of old statements) are disregarded. 
Furthermore, since the early recognition of crises is the focus of this thesis, organizational 
crises that were the result of single, unpredictable events are omitted. Such examples 
include HSBC or BP, which plunged as a result of the Global Financial Crisis or the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill respectively. Other possible cases that are omitted are such 
where fraudulent behavior was either the cause or the prevalent feature responsible for 
delayed recognition. Those cases, which include Enron or WorldCom, are excluded based 
on the assumption that a framework would not have been able to prevent them. 
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The selected turnaround cases are listed in Table 4, where also the relevant 
industry and timespan are shown. The timespan analyzed has also been subject to the 
availability of financial information and has been determined to illustrate the corporate 
decline appropriately. In order to show the crisis development, the changes in the year-
end stock price were depicted in a graph. By doing so, the recognition relevant time frame 
can be illustrated more appropriately.  
Table 4: Selected Case Studies 
Company Industry Timespan 
Alpiq  Energy 2008 – 2018 
BlackBerry Telecommunications 2004 – 2016 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals 1997 – 2012 
General Electric  Conglomerate 2010 – 2018 
Rieter Group Textile, Engineering 2008 – 2018 
Rolls-Royce Aerospace, Defense, Marine 2009 – 2018 
Starbucks Restaurants 2002 – 2012 
Under Armour Apparel & Textile Products 2009 – 2018 
3.3.1 Sample Size 
The sample size has been restricted to eight cases based on the limited time 
available to conduct the analysis and write the thesis. Nonetheless, by using eight distinct 
case studies, it can be ensured that the analysis is meaningful, and the results add value 
to the existing research. Furthermore, due to the nature of the analysis, the practical 
applicability of the proposed framework can be evaluated. 
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4 Findings  
The findings of the cases are presented in a coherent manner. First, a brief 
overview of the company is given to specify the peculiarities of each case and the 
respective industry. By doing so, the individualities of each case can be highlighted, and 
a better understanding of the comparisons can be fostered. Second, by referring to the 
year-end stock price development, the reasons for selecting the overall, as well as the 
EWS-relevant timeframe are explained. Following, the results of the EWS model 
applications will be illustrated, and the development of each measurement score will be 
assessed. To increase the understanding, the calculated scores, as visible in the respective 
appendices, and their radar score counterpart have been given in squared brackets [ratio 
value/radar score]. Finally, every case will be concluded by specifically evaluating which 
scores successfully predicted the imminent crisis and which played a minor role in the 
early recognition. Therewith, the relevance of each score for the condensed EWS 
framework can be emphasized. 
4.1 Alpiq Holding AG 
Alpiq is one of the leading electricity producer and energy provider in Europe 
(Alpiq, 2019). The company is the result of the 2009 merger between the two Swiss 
energy companies Atel (Aare-Tessin Ltd. for Electivity) and EOS (Energie Ouest Suisse) 
(Alpiq, n.d.). While initially believed to have enormous future growth potential (Alpiq, 
2010), Alpiq failed to live up to the hype and its share price plummeted (Figure 6). The 
decline is exacerbated by the impacts of climate and nuclear power reforms on the core 
business of the firm (Alpiq, 2010 & 2014).  
In this case, the time frame was chosen to include the last pre-merger financial 
information up to the most recently published ones (Figure 6). The inclusion of the 2008 
pre-merger results is essential because it could potentially explain one of the underlying 
reasons for the late recognition of the crisis. By extending the overall financial analysis 
to the 2018 fiscal results, it can be illustrated that the firm still trades at less than a fifth 
of its pre-merger value and thus has not managed a successful business turnaround yet. 
In terms of early recognition, the timespan from 2008 to 2012 seems to be most relevant, 
as by 2013 the stock price information by itself should have been sufficient proof of the 
evident organizational crisis. The results of the application of the EWS framework to the 
recognition timespan are depicted in Figure 7 and will be elucidated in this chapter, while 
the results of the complete analysis can be found in Appendix III.   
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Figure 6: Year-end Stock Price Development Alpiq 
 
Figure 7: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Alpiq 
Activity: There is a net increase in the working capital turnover from 2008 
[11,9/7,38] to 2012 [13,4/7,69]. The initial decline in the ratio, which dropped in 2009 
[10,5/7,09], can potentially be attributed to post-merger integration difficulties, which 
seem to have been overcome by 2010 [18,9/8,79]. Due to very little working capital and 
comparably high revenues, 2011 [113,5/10] can be recognized as an outlier year, where 
the WC turnover skyrocketed. In the following year, the ratio decreased and lied below 
the 2010 [13,4/7,69], which indicates less efficient working capital management. The WC 
turnover decreased by two thirds after the analyzed period and has not recovered since.  
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Coverage: The debt ratio has already been extremely low in 2008 [0,10/3,02] and 
progressively decreased in the following years. By 2012, only four percent of the 
company’s debt was covered by its operating cash flow [0,035/2,68], whereas in 2008 is 
was still nearly nine percent [0,085/2,93]. 
Leverage: This ratio initially increased from 2008 [0,60/5,96] to 2010 [0,58/6,14] 
and then marginally in the following two years. By 2012 [0,64/5,70] the ratio fell below 
the 2008 values, which hints at a riskier financial position. Overall, the debt ratio 
remained constant without severe fluctuations.  
Liquidity: The liquidity ratios initially decreased from 2008 [Current: 1,30/2,60; 
Quick: 1,27/2,55] to 2011 [Current: 1,03/2,06; Quick: 1,00/2,01]  but recovered in the 
following year [Current: 1,27/2,54; Quick: 1,25/2,50]. Overall, the potential liquidation 
of the company’s assets would have covered its liabilities at any time during the corporate 
decay. Solely taking the liquidity ratios into account, it could be assumed that the liquidity 
of Alpiq was not endangered, despite incurring losses in 2011 and 2012.  
Profitability: Post-merger [ROA: 3,36/3,89; ROE: 8,52/4,75], both ratios, were 
less than half of value in the previous year [ROA: 6,94/4,49; ROE: 19,1/6,52]. It could 
be argued that the focus on post-merger integration of Atel and EOS is responsible for 
this considerable decline. Furthermore, since both ratios remained on the same level in 
the following year [ROA: 3,49/3,92; ROE: 8,29/4,72], these lower scores may have been 
accepted as the standard for the newly created company. The cognitive behavior of 
accepting a less favorable position is commonly known as normalization of deviance and 
can be the decisive factor for failing to recognize the severity of a crisis situation (Tinsley, 
Dillon & Madsen, 2011). However, the profitability ratios plummeted in the next period 
[ROA: -7,71/ 2,05; ROE: -21,7/0] and were negative for the majority of the following 
years. In 2018, Alpiq has still not recovered and continues to generate losses.  
Discriminant and logit analysis: The Z-score development of Alpiq shows that 
while already Atel was in an uncertain position [3,07/3,07], it got continuously worse in 
the post-merger years. By 2011 [0,98/0,98], the score fell below one, which clearly 
indicates liquidity problems. This is reinforced by the logit score drastically falling from 
2010 [96,7%/9,67] to 2011 [11,4%/1,14]. Consequently, a turnaround situation was 
apparent in 2011, as Alpiq had a 11,4 percent chance that it was financially healthy. 
Similar to the other ratios, both the Z-score and the logit score immediately decreased 
after the merger and have failed to reach similar heights ever since.   
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Conclusively, it can be stated that, due to the prevailing circumstances in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the normalization of deviance, the crisis was 
likely only recognized in 2013 when Alpiq’s net revenue decreased by more than 25 
percent. Despite previously incurring net losses, the situation initially seemed to improve, 
before starting to deteriorate again in 2013. As a result, it can be argued that the company 
management was still optimistic that the losses were a short-lived phenomenon and no 
far-reaching corrective measures were taken, prior to the acknowledgement of the crisis. 
Regardless, the transition to a liquidity crisis occurred in 2011, as illustrated by the fall 
in the logit score. The application of the broad EWS model shows that the earliest possible 
indicators for a crisis situation were already visible in 2009. Initially, the halving of the 
Z-score and organizational profitability in 2009, followed by the halving of the cash flow 
to debt ratio until 2010, possibly indicated the imminent crisis situation. At this point, the 
crisis could have already been recognized and corrective measures could have been 
initiated. After all, the EWS model predicted to looming organizational crisis two years 
prior to the occurrence of a turnaround situation. 
4.2 BlackBerry Limited 
The company was originally founded as Research in Motion in 1984 and 
revolutionized the telecommunications industry with the introduction of the BlackBerry 
mobile phones around the turn of the century (Research in Motion, 2012). With the 
increasing prominence of Apple and Samsung in the telecommunications market, 
BlackBerry’s sales began to decrease after 2011 (Appendix IV). In 2016, the company 
stated that it will outsource all its hardware developments to partners and solely focus on 
software (George-Cosh & McNish, 2016). 
The year-end stock price development shows that the timeframe was chosen in 
order to illustrate the rise and fall of this once omnipresent brand. In terms of recognition, 
the relevant timespan includes the fiscal years from 2008 to 2013 (Figure 8). The former 
was included to show that there have been some negative developments while the stock 
price was still rising. Figure 9 shows the results of the application of the EWS framework 
to the recognition timespan. As with the other case studies, the complete financial analysis 
can be found in the respective appendix (Appendix IV).  
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Figure 8: Year-end Stock Price Development BlackBerry 
 
Figure 9: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan BlackBerry 
Activity: The organizational efficiency, as measured by the working capital 
turnover, continuously increased from 2008 [3,00/5,60] to 2011 [5,16/6,03]. In the 
following year, there was a marginal decrease in the ratio [5,03/6,02], followed by 
substantial decrease in 2013 [3,03/5,61]. The working capital turnover has been 
decreasing ever since, falling below 1 in 2018. Overall, the WC turnover achieved a net 
increase in the recognition-relevant timeframe and behaved in a similar manner as in the 
Alpiq case study. 
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Coverage: The cash flow to debt ratio shows the first considerable decline 
between 2008 [1,00/7,50] and 2009 [0,65/5,76]. In the following period the ratio nearly 
doubled [1,17/8,33], before beginning to decrease again in 2011 [1,02/7,59]. In the 2012 
fiscal year [0,80/6,51], a further decline in the coverage ratio can be recognized. The 
negative trend continued, and the ratio dropped by nearly 40 percent until 2013 
[0,62/5,61]. In 2014, the operating cash flow coverage became negative. 
Leverage: Similar to the Alpiq example, the debt ratio changed only marginally 
over the assessed period from 2008 [0,29/8,09] to 2013 [0,28/8,12]. The debt ratio 
initially decreased until 2010 [0,25/8,30], showing an increasingly less risky financial 
situation for BlackBerry. The was a small spark in the ratio in 2011 [0,31/7,96], which 
marks the highest level of debt for the recognition-relevant time period. The debt level 
increased rather drastically thereafter.  
Liquidity: The quick and current ratios improved from 2008 [Current: 2,36/4,72; 
Quick: 2,08/4,18] until 2010 [Current: 2,39/4,78; Quick: 2,13/4,27] and began to drop in 
2011 [Current: 2,06/4,13; Quick: 1,89/3,79]. Both ratios remained roughly on the same 
level for the rest of the timespan. Overall the liquidity ratios stayed above their respective 
limits, which implies financial health for the whole recognition-relevant period.  
Profitability: The profitability ratios do not reveal as clear a picture as they did 
in the Alpiq case. In the beginning, the ratios slightly declined from 2008 [ROA: 
23,5/7;25; ROE: 32,9/8,70] to 2009 [ROA: 23,4/7,23; ROE: 32,2/8,70]. From thereon the 
ratios improved until 2011 [ROA: 26,5/7,75; ROE: 38,2/9,69], before plummeting by 
nearly 75 percent in 2012 [ROA: 8,48/4,75; ROE: 11,5/5,25] and becoming negative in 
2013 [ROA: -4,91/2,52; ROE: -6,83/2,20]. BlackBerry continued to generate negative 
profits until the 2018 fiscal period. 
Discriminant and logit analysis: The logit score remained above 99 percent until 
2013 [59,4%/5,94], where it fell notably, indicating the presence of a turnaround 
situation. The score fell further to 0 percent in the following fiscal year, which indicates 
a 100 percent probability that BlackBerry was in financial troubles. In 2010 [12,0/10], the 
Z-score was still above the upper limit of the radar scale but decreased by more than 50 
percent in 2011 [5,13/5,13]. This worrying development continued, and the Z-value fell 
further until 2013 [2,33/2,33] and even became negative in 2014.  
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In the BlackBerry case, the crisis transitioned to an earnings crisis in 2012, as the 
net income began to be affected. In the following year, the logit score indicated the shift 
towards a liquidity crisis. According to the theory, it can be assumed that the crisis was 
recognized as soon as the first losses occurred in 2013. However, it could also be argued 
that the falling stock price may have already raised the awareness of the crisis in 2011. In 
this case, the EWS framework would have only confirmed its existence. However, since 
the previous stock price decline was followed by a period of continuous growth, optimism 
could have still been the prevailing management rhetoric at that time. Regardless, the 
framework clearly indicated the deteriorating situation two years before the solvency of 
the firm became endangered. In 2011, the Z-score already showed a remarkable decline, 
which should have already caused serious concern among BlackBerry’s top management. 
In the following year, the falling profitability, combined with the decreasing coverage 
ratio, further underlined the increasing severity of the symptoms. In regard to the 
proposed hypothesis, the application of the model would have predicted the imminent 
crisis two years prior to the occurrence of a turnaround situation. 
4.3 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Bristol-Myers Squibb is a pharmaceutical company that sells and licenses pharma 
products globally (Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2013). The pharmaceutical industry is heavily 
dependent on R&D as well as patents, which could have a decisive effect on net revenues 
(Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2013). In 2012, for example, the company’s earnings plummeted 
due to the loss of exclusivity of Avapro/Avalide and Plavix (Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2013).  
As visible in Figure 10, the organization was subject to a drastic decrease in the 
year-end stock price in the early 2000s but has been able to recover since. The analysis 
of the complete, fifteen-year timespan revealed that the period from the turn of the century 
to 2005 is the most decisive in terms of early crisis recognition. Therefore, the EWS 
framework application focuses this specific timeframe and its results are elucidated 
accordingly. The results, as explained, will be illustrated in a radar graph that allows the 
interpretation of the changes in the respective score (Figure 11). The complete analysis 
can be found in Appendix V and will not be discussed in detail.  
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Figure 10: Year-end Stock Price Development Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 
Figure 11: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Activity: The working capital turnover of Bristol-Myers Squibb has improved 
drastically between 2000 [4,35/5,87] and 2002 [10,3/7,06] and the ratio more than 
doubled. In the subsequent year [4,11/5,82], the ratio plummeted lower than the 2000 
level and further decreased until 2005 [3,56/5,71]. Consequently, while the working 
capital was managed increasingly more efficiently until 2002, the notable drop in 
efficiency in 2003 indicates serious underlying issues within the organization.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000199919981997
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital
turnover
Cash flow to debt
ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
 37 
 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
Coverage: The cash flow to debt ratio decreased remarkably in the first two years 
from [0,55/5,27] in 2000 to [0,06/2,80] in 2002. This shows that by 2002, at the lowest 
point of the year-end stock price development, Bristol-Myers Squibb could only cover 6 
percent of its debt with its operating cash flow. The ratio then improved remarkably in 
2003 [0,20/3,49], before declining in 2004 [0,16/3,28] and 2005 [0,11/3,04].  
Leverage: The debt ratio in the Bristol-Myers Squibb example shows a 
substantial increase in the first five fiscal periods from [0,48/6,81] in 2000 to [0,66/5,57] 
in 2004. This indicates that a increasingly higher proportion of the invested funds was 
raised from liabilities. In 2005 [0,60/5,99], the ratio began to decrease again. 
Liquidity: Since both liquidity ratios remained above 1 for the entire period, they 
do not indicate grave liquidity issues. Both ratios decreased in the first three years from 
2000 [Current: 1,74/3,49; Quick: 1,42/2,84] to 2002 [Current: 1,21/2,43; Quick: 
1,02/2,04]. Subsequently, the current and quick ratio both increased until 2005 [Current: 
1,78/3,57; Quick: 1,48/2,97], with shortly decreasing in 2004 [Current: 1,50/3,01; Quick: 
1,32/2,64].  
Profitability: Overall, the pharmaceutical industry is extremely profitable, which 
is shown by Bristol-Myers Squibb achieving a ROA of up to 34 percent and a ROE of 
over 70 percent in 2009. During the assessed period, the profitability initially decreased 
drastically between 2000 [ROA: 23,3/7,22; ROE: 44,6/10] and 2001 [ROA: 9,34/4,89; 
ROE: 23,4/7,26]. In the following two periods, Bristol-Myer Squibb achieved an increase 
in profitability until 2003 [ROA: 11,3/5,22; ROE: 31,7/8,62], before it dropped in 2004 
[ROA: 7,85/4,64; ROE: 23,4/7,23] and rose again to similar heights in 2005 [ROA: 
10,7/5,11; ROE: 26,8/7,79]. Overall, there is a distinct negative development over the 
recognition timespan, which serves as an indicator for the struggles Bristol-Myers Squibb 
faced during this period.   
Discriminant and logit analysis: The Z-score shows the same pattern as the 
profitability ratios, as it decreased drastically from 2000 [9,47/9,47] to 2001 [4,42/4,42] 
and further declined in 2002 [3,22/3,22]. Thereafter, the score improved until 2005 
[3,52/3,52], which shows that a potential crisis was tackled accordingly. The logit score 
never indicated the presence of a turnaround situation, as the lowest point in 2004 
[90,7%/9,07] remained far above the 78 percent limit. Hence, the company never faced 
liquidity troubles during the organizational decay.   
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Conclusively, the Bristol-Myers Squibb case study serves as the perfect example 
that the early recognition of crisis leads to a timely resolution. Not only did the company’s 
net income hardly decline over the analyzed period, the liquidity was never endangered 
either. Therefore, it can be claimed that the crisis was recognized in due time, since the 
strategy crisis never transitioned to the next crisis stage. The application of the EWS 
framework reveals that the first concerning signs became visible in 2001, when the Z-
score decreased substantially. Due to the fall in the year-end stock price, it can be assumed 
that the crisis was recognized in 2002 and corrective measures were taken accordingly, 
stopping the organizational decay. Moreover, the fact that most of the scores improved in 
2005, possibly indicates that the measures have been successful. Consequently, this case 
example proves the theory that crises can be rectified more easily, if they are recognized 
in their early stages. Nonetheless, the EWS results once again demonstrated the predictive 
strengths of the proposed framework, since the crisis signs became increasingly more 
obvious. Furthermore, without the earnings or liquidity situation of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
having been affected, a turnaround situation was never apparent. It can be assumed that 
the logit score would have decreased even further in 2005, potentially indicating a 
turnaround situation, if no corrective measures were taken. Therefore, the EWS model 
once again managed to predict the imminent turnaround situation. 
4.4 General Electric Company 
General Electric (GE) is an international conglomerate that was founded in 1892 
and currently operates in several industries, ranging from aircraft engines, to gas 
production (Reuters, n.d.a). As visible in Figure 12, the year-end stock price plummeted 
quite recently, which makes it a very interesting case study for the application of the 
created EWS model. Furthermore, GE is renowned for successful turnaround 
management, as Jack Welch once pushed the company from an inefficient industrial giant 
to one of America’s most profitable corporations (Wellauer, 1995). By having already 
experienced a corporate turnaround, albeit being over 30 years ago, it will be interesting 
to see to what extent the recent organizational decay was foreseeable. 
Since the corporate decline occurred rather recently, the analyzed timeframe 
relevant for the early recognition, was set to 2014-2018. The former was included because 
it will show whether or not the decline was already imminent while the stock price kept 
improving. The detailed analysis of the complete timeframe can be found in Appendix 
VI.   
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Figure 12: Year-end Stock Price Development General Electric 
 
Figure 13: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan General Electric 
Activity: Similar to previous cases studies, the working capital turnover increased 
in the analyzed timespan from 2014 [0,50/5,10] to 2018 [2,04/5,41]. The remarkable 
increase shows that the working capital is employed progressively more efficiently, 
despite the company suffering from a major stock price decline. The drastic increase from 
2014 [0,50/5,10] to 2015 [1,79/5,35] may have increased management optimism 
regarding the future prospects of the firm, since it correlated with the initial stock price 
improvement.   
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Coverage:  The cash flow coverage was already extremely poor in 2014 
[0,05/2,77], remained on the same level in 2015 [0,05/2,76], before it became negative in 
2016 [-0,0009/2,50]. In the following fiscal period in 2017 [0,04/2,68], it improved to 
around 4 percent, only to plummet again in 2018 [0,02/2,58]. Overall, at no point during 
the examined timespan was the operating cash flow covering more than five percent of 
the total liabilities of General Electric. 
Leverage: There was small net increase in the debt ratio from 2014 [0,79/4,74] 
to 2018 [0,83/4,45], which shows that the financial situation of General Electric became 
riskier in the course of the corporate decay. However, this is only reflected in a marginal 
increase and the ratio remained roughly on the same level throughout the assessed period.  
Liquidity: Both ratios decreased remarkably by more than 50 percent between 
2014 [Current: 3,57/7,14; Quick: 3,42/6,83] and 2015 [Current: 1,63/3,25; Quick: 
1,41/2,82]. In the following years, the both ratios gradually increased again until the most 
recent fiscal year [Current: 1,96/3,91; Quick: 1,65/3,29], without ever approaching 
similar values as in 2014.  
Profitability: While the profitability initially increased until 2014 [ROA: 
2,37/3,73; ROE 11,2/5,20], it plummeted to negative figures in 2015 [ROA: -1,18/3,14; 
ROE: -5,79/2,37]. However, the fact that the profitability recovered in 2016 [ROA: 
2,34/3,72; ROE: 11,0/5,17] may have fostered the internal belief that the fall in corporate 
performance was only an evanescent issue. By again achieving negative profits in 2017 
[ROA: -1,6/3,07; ROE: -7,39/2,10], and further declining profitability in 2018 [ROA: -
7,26/2,12; ROE: -43,6/0], the corporate crisis was likely to have been acknowledged. 
Discriminant and logit analysis: While the net profits were still increasing 
between 2010 and 2014, the logit score was declining and showed a 0,07 percent 
probability that General Electric was financially sound in 2014 [0,07%/0,01]. Although 
the score improved until 2016 [15,9%/1,59], the financial situation only improved 
marginally with the logit score still indicating imminent bankruptcy. Furthermore, also 
the Z-score already showed the underlying troubles within General Electric in 2014 
[1,58/1,58]. The score continuously decreased, with the exception of a spike 2016 
[1,88/1,88], and reached its lowest point in 2018 [1,05/1,05]. Overall, GE’s discriminant 
value only slightly surpassed the proposed lower limit of 1,81 in its outlier year in 2016. 
This short-lived improvement coincided with the highest stock price for the complete 
timespan.   
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The General Electric case is somewhat an exception to the previously analyzed 
cases, in that the logit score and Z-value have indicated a crisis situation since the 
beginning of the timeframe. Although the stock price was still achieving continuous 
growth, the underlying issues within the corporation became increasingly more visible. 
A notable decrease in the liquidity, as well as the profitability ratios in 2015, further 
reinforced the existence of a corporate crisis even before the stock price plummeted. 
While the company generated net losses in 2015, the fiscal results were probably seen as 
negative outliers, due to the subsequent increase in net revenues in 2016. This 
development is also recognized on the stock market and reflected in an additional increase 
in the stock price. Consequently, it can be argued that the existence of the crisis was not 
acknowledged until 2018, when the net losses increased more than threefold. Since the 
logit score was consistently indicating a turnaround situation, a liquidity crisis was 
apparent, and the application of the model would not have predicted the crisis prior to 
affecting the solvency of the firm. However, since it can be argued that the crisis was not 
acknowledged until 2018, the EWS framework would have enabled the GE management 
to introduce corrective measures at least four fiscal periods prior to the crisis recognition.  
4.5 Rieter Group 
Rieter is a globally operating industrial company that originated in Switzerland in 
1796 (Rieter, 2010). By focusing on innovation, Rieter became on of the leading suppliers 
in textile and automotive systems (Rieter, 2010).  
The year-end stock price skyrocketed in the aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis, before dropping by more than 50 percent in 2011, and reaching its lowest point in 
2018 (Figure 14). The fact that the crisis resolution seems to have not been sustainable, 
makes Rieter an interesting case study for the subject of turnaround management. Since 
the initial crisis has not been successfully resolved, the early recognition of the second 
major decline is somewhat superfluous. Consequently, this thesis focuses the application 
of the EWS framework on the initial crisis. The results are depicted in Figure 15 and will 
be explained accordingly. The analysis of the complete timespan will not be discussed in 
detail and can be found in Appendix VII.  
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Figure 14: Year-end Stock Price Development Rieter 
 
Figure 15: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Rieter 
Activity: The working capital turnover nearly halved in between 2009 [11,6/7,32] 
and 2010 [6,76/6,35]. The following year [2,28/5,46] saw another decline by two thirds. 
In 2012, the working capital turnover only changed marginally [2,18/5,44] and increased 
in 2013 [3,05/5,61] and 2014 [3,78/5,76]. Despite the improvement over the last two 
years, the working capital turnover was still less than a third of its initial value in 2009. 
This means that Rieter generally, employed their working capital less efficiently than in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
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Coverage: The coverage ratio fluctuated highly but generally remained at a very 
low level. While the operational cash flow could not cover the debt of the company in 
2009 [-0,001/2,49], the ratio increased until 2011 [0,11/3,06]. The following three years 
were very inconsistent as the ratio first decreased to around a tenth of the previous year’s 
result in 2012 [0,01/2,57], then rose to a five-year high in 2013 [0,15/3,24], before slightly 
decreasing once again in the last year [0,12/3,08]. 
Leverage: The debt ratio remained at a constant level for the analyzed period 
between 2009 [0,64/5,74] and 2014 [0,63/5,77]. Consequently, it can be recognized that 
the financial risk within the firm remained at roughly the same level over the assessed 
timeframe. 
Liquidity: The quick and the current ratio roughly doubled from 2009 [Current: 
1,22/2,44; Quick: 0,87/1,74] to 2011 [Current: 2,44/4,88; Quick: 1,71/3,43]. 
Subsequently both ratios decreased from 2012 [Current: 2,33/4,66; Quick: 1,58/3,16] to 
2014 [Current: 1,58/3,16; Quick: 1,09/2,19]. Therefore, it can be recognized that the 
current liabilities began to increase relative to the current and quick assets when the stock 
price plunged. This could have arguably been due to the necessity of an increased supply 
of debt capital in order to tackle the crisis accordingly.  
Profitability: Rieter was incurring losses in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in 2009 [ROA: -12,0/1,34; ROE -33,2/0] and only began generating profits in 2010 
[ROA: 2,11/3,69; ROE 6,63/4,44]. 2011 [ROA: 10,7/5,12; ROE: 31,4/8,56] was an 
outlier period, as the profitability increased by more than 500 percent. In the following 
year, [ROA: 2,48/3,75; ROE: 7,03/4,51] both ratios reached pre-2011 figures and 
continuously increased thereon until 2014 [ROA: 4,37/4,06; ROE: 12,0/5,33]. Overall, 
Rieter achieved a substantial net increase in organizational profitability over the assessed 
period. 
Discriminant and logit analysis: The developments in the Z-score and the logit 
score show that the increase in profitability may have distorted the reality to some extent. 
Although the Z-score increased from 2009 [1,43/1,43] to 2010 [2,48/2,48], it decreased 
in the following two years until 2012 [2,09/2,09]. By 2014 [2,13/2,13], the score had risen 
again. Regardless, the logit score indicated that Rieter’s financial health improved 
remarkably from 2009 [1,04%/0,14] to 2010 [76,5%/7,65] and even surpassed the 78-
percent threshold in 2011 [98,6%/9,86]. However, in 2012 [68,0%/6,80]. the logistic 
regression analysis revealed the presence of a liquidity crisis.   
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The decreasing activity ratio already shows the first signs of concern in 2009. 
However, the logit model implies that Rieter’s financial situation got increasingly 
healthier at the beginning. Therefore, the application of the EWS would have yielded 
contradictory statements. The most prominent indicator so far, the Z-score, did indicate 
an uncertain situation, since it never rose above 2,67. Therefore, according to Altman’s 
(1968) analysis, the situation at the time should have been subject to further investigation, 
which probably would have uncovered more red flags. Furthermore, the opposing 
developments in the discriminant analysis and logistic regression should have alarmed 
the company’s management in 2011 and warned of the decline in 2012. Overall, the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis may have distorted the EWS analysis to some 
extent. Nonetheless, the Rieter case study is important because it shows that there may be 
ambiguous results and that an unsustainable turnaround results in another corporate decay 
soon after. 
4.6 Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 
Rolls-Royce was originally founded as a car manufacturer in 1906 and entered the 
aerospace industry eight years later (Rolls-Royce, n.d.). The company quickly became 
known for its high-quality engineering and established itself as one of the prominent 
brands in engineering (Rolls-Royce, n.d.).  
Similar to previous cases, the timeframe was chosen in order to reflect the rise and 
fall of the brand within a given time period (Figure 16). In terms of early recognition, the 
last year prior to the decline in stock price, and the first year where the price rose again, 
are seen as the boundaries of the relevant timeframe.  
 
Figure 16: Year-end Stock Price Development Rolls-Royce 
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Figure 17: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Rolls-Royce 
Activity: While the working capital turnover marginally improved between 2012 
[5,07/6,01] and 2013 [5,11/6,01], it plunged in 2014 [3,92/5,78] and further decrease in 
2015 [3,48/5,70]. In the following fiscal period [4,50/5,90], the working capital was 
employed more efficiently again. The increase in the WC turnover possibly indicates that 
the previously existing problems have been overcome.  
Coverage: The cash flow to debt ratio showed and initial increase from 
[0,10/3,02] in 2012 to [0,12/3,11] in 2013, before falling to [0,08/2,91] in 2014. In the 
following two fiscal years, the coverage ratio further declined until reaching [0,06/2,80] 
in 2016. Consequently, it can be recognized that the cash flow coverage of the total 
liabilities progressively decreased over the analyzed timespan.  
Leverage: The debt ratio continuously increased from [0,66/5,58] in 2012 to 
[0,71/5,25] in 2014, to [0.93/3,82] in 2016. This progressive incline in the debt ratio 
implies that financial situation of Rolls-Royce has become increasingly riskier over the 
course of the analysis, as the proportion of assets financed by debt increased remarkably.  
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Liquidity: The liquidity ratios increased in the first four years from 2012 
[Current: 1,33/2,67; Quick: 0,95/1,91] to 2015 [Current: 1,48/2,96; Quick: 1,16/2,96], 
which implies that Rolls-Royce’s ability to cover its current liabilities increased during 
this period. In 2016 [Current: 1,35/2,70; Quick: 1,02/2,70], both ratios decreased and have 
been declining ever since. 
Profitability: 2012 [ROA: 12,7/5,44; ROE: 37,6/9,60] was an outlier year 
regarding Rolls-Royce’s profitability as it skyrocketed. Subsequently, the ratios 
decreased by more than 50 percent in 2013 [ROA: 5,80/4,33; ROE: 21,9/6,98] and further 
plummeted in 2014 [ROA: 0,21/3,38; ROE: 0,91/3,48]. A slight increase in 2015 [ROA: 
0,38/3,40; ROE: 1,67/3,61] was answered by negative profitability ratios in 2016 [ROA: 
-15,8/0,70; ROE: -216/0]. In the following years, the ratios fluctuated immensely between 
high returns in one period and negative returns in another. The annual statement shows 
that the outlier year in 2012, could have been to the restructuring of a business unit (Rolls-
Royce, 2013). 
Discriminant and logit analysis: The corporate decay was signaled by a steadily 
declining Z-score from [1,83/1,83] in 2012 to [0,21/0,21] in 2016. The immense initial 
drop from 2012 [1,83/1,83] to 2013 [1,48/1,48] classified the company as insolvent 
according to Altman’s (1968) definition. By nearly reaching 0, the discriminant analysis 
indicates that Rolls-Royce was extremely close to organizational failure. The logit score 
shows a similar reality as in other case studies. Subsequently to the Z-score declining in 
2013, the logit model indicated a 40,6 percent chance of financial health in 2014 
[40,6%/4,06]. In the previous two years, the ratio only declined marginally from 2012 
[99,9%/9,99] to 2013 [94,5%/9,45]. After already indicating financial troubles in 2014, 
the logit score further declined to 0 percent in 2016 [0,00%/0].  
Conclusively, the declining discriminant and logit results show that the imminent 
crisis became increasingly severe and reached the liquidity crisis stage in 2014. The 
decline in the logit score indicated this transition to the next crisis stage already in the 
previous year. Furthermore, it could even be argued, since the Z-score was never above 
1,85 in any of the previous period, that the symptoms of the looming crisis were already 
visible six fiscal periods before the logit score indicated that Rolls-Royce’s solvency was 
endangered. Consequently, the application of this model once again managed to show the 
underlying organizational issues, while the stock market was still largely optimistic.  
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4.7 Starbucks 
Starbucks was formed in 1985 and has become a global leader in ready-to-go 
beverages (Starbucks, 2013). The company focused on rapid extension in the early 2000s 
(Starbucks, 2003).  
During this period, the stock price continuously grew until 2006 where it was 
subject to a rapid decline (Figure 18). In the following two-year period until 2008, the 
company stock price fell below the 2002 value, indicating an organizational crisis. 
Therefore, the application of the EWS model focuses on the years prior to the decline.  
 
Figure 18: Year-end Stock Price Development Starbucks 
 
Figure 19: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Starbucks  
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Figure 19 shows the results of the EWS analysis, which will be elucidated on the 
following pages. The complete financial data can be found in Appendix IX. 
Activity: The working capital turnover for Starbucks drops drastically from 
[9,04/6,81] in 2004 to [-360/0] in 2005. While it recovered in the following period 
[19,2/1,16], it remained negative until 2008 [-23,5/0,30]. The considerable increase in 
assets with a comparably small increase in liabilities, possibly reflects business 
acquisitions. Since Starbucks was pursuing rapid growth, it can be argued that this 
decrease was not alarming to their management.  
Coverage: The cash flow to debt ratio decreased continuously from [0,95/7,27] 
in 2004 to [0,64/574] in 2005, and to [0,39/4,48] in 2008. This development shows that 
the operating cash flow was increasingly less able to cover Starbuck’s total liabilities. In 
consideration of the company’s growth ambitions, this decrease was probably also 
expected by them. 
Leverage: The leverage ratio continuously increased form [0,25/8,33] in 2004 to 
[0,41/7,30] in 2005 and further to [0,56/62,6] in 2008. These changes show that 
increasingly more assets have been financed by liabilities, which taking Starbuck’s 
growth objectives into account, was probably also anticipated. 
Liquidity: The same reasoning applies to Starbuck’s liquidity ratios, which 
showed a substantial decrease from 2004 [Current: 1,76/3,51; Quick: 1,21/2,42] to 2008 
[Current: 0,80/1,60; Quick: 0,48/0,96].  
Profitability: Likewise, the profitability ratios fail to reveal clear symptoms of 
the organizational decline. First, both ratios increased from 2004 [ROA: 11,8/5,30; ROE: 
15,7/5,96] to 2005 [ROA: 14,1/5,68; ROE: 23,7/7,28]. While the ROA dropped to 
[12,74/5,46] in 2006 and [12,6/5,43] in 2007, the ROE further increased to [25,3/7,55] in 
2006 to [29,4/8,24] in 2007. The diverging ratios show that while the return increase in 
terms of equity, it decreased when compared to the company’s assets. This further 
reinforces that Starbucks was following its growth strategy by acquiring businesses. Only 
in 2008, some sings of crisis became visible as the profitability decreased by more than 
50 percent [ROA: 5,56/4,26; ROE: 12,7/5,44]. Consequently, only when the stock price 
reached its lowest level, the profitability of Starbucks was affected.  
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Discriminant and logit analysis: The Z-score initially increased form 2004 
[6,96/6,96] to 2005 [8,06/8,06]. However, the subsequent decline in 2006 [6,51/6,51] 
indicated the beginning of a negative trend, which continued until 2008 [3,24/3,24], 
where the score reached a low point. The logit analysis never showed the presence of a 
turnaround situation and even at its minimum in 2008 [91,9%/9,91], the score indicated 
a more than 90 percent chance of financial health. Consequently, no turnaround situation 
was present during the analyzed period.  
The organizational decay only transitioned to an earnings crisis in 2008, when the 
net revenue halved. Overall, it can be argued that, in this specific case, the company would 
have probably ignored any signs of potential crises because they were anticipated. By 
heavily focusing on organizational growth, Starbucks likely expected some ratios to 
decrease as a result of this strategy. However, the decrease in the Z-score in 2006 may 
have warned of the looming decline, while the stock price was still rising. This shows 
that, despite lower ratios having been projected, the decrease in the Z-score indicated an 
increasingly more vulnerable financial position. Therefore, it can be claimed that some 
acquisitions may not have been as favorable as they were believed to be. The further 
declining Z-score confirmed the negative trend and warned of the growing underlying 
troubles. Since the logit model never announced a turnaround situation, it shows that 
Starbucks recognized the crisis and has acted accordingly. This is further reflected by the 
subsequent stock market increase in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, and its 
immense brand recognition nowadays. 
4.8 Under Armour Inc. 
Under Armour is a sports apparel brand focusing on the development of clothes, 
accessories and shoes (Reuters, n.d.b). Its business is still largely focused on North 
America, with only a handful of stores abroad (Retuers, n.d.b). 
While the year-end stock price reflected an immense growth period between 2009 
and 2015 (Figure 20), the company has recently faced financial troubles resulting in net 
losses for the last two fiscal periods (Appendix X). The complete analysis is visible in 
Appendix X and the results of the recognition relevant timeframe are discussed below. In 
order to test the predictive capabilities of the framework, the recognition analysis includes 
the fiscal periods from 2014 to 2018.  
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Figure 20: Year-end Stock Price Development Under Armour 
 
Figure 21: EWS Framework Recognition Timespan Under Armour 
Activity: The activity ratio increased over the analyzed timespan from 2014 
[2,73/5,55] to 2018 [4,06/5,81]. Only the 2016 [3,77/5,75] fiscal year resulted in a 
marginal decline in the working capital turnover. Therefore, Under Armour managed to 
increase its organizational efficiency, as measured by the WC turnover, in the course of 
the last six years. An increase in the efficiency ratio despite facing a crisis, seems to be 
the underlying tendency in the examined cases. 
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Coverage: During the assessed timeline, the coverage ratio was extremely 
volatile. While it initially decreased from [0,29/3,97] in 2014 to [-0,05/2,32] in 2015, the 
cash flow to debt ratio experienced a minor uplift the subsequent year to [0,19/3,44]. 
Regardless, the ratio then declined again in 2017 [0,12/3,09], before doubling in 2018 
[0,28/3,91]. Overall, the operating cash flow has been concerningly inconsistent, which 
could have been a red flag as the crisis was imminent. 
Leverage: The debt ratio shows a continuous deterioration from 2014 [0,36/7,63] 
to 2018 [0,52/6,50]. This development shows that the financial risk increased over the 
course of the last six fiscal periods. Since the downward trend already started prior to the 
fall on the stock markets, it could have been a potential indicator for the looming decay. 
Liquidity: Similar to the debt ratio, the current ratio decreased progressively from 
2014 [3,67/7,35] to 2018 [1,97/3,94]. This shows an accumulation of current liabilities, 
which can be seen as a sign of looming crises. Regardless, both liquidity ratios remained 
above the respective benchmarks. The quick ratio also experienced a net decrease from 
2014 [2,40/4,88] to 2018 [1,20/2,39] but fluctuated more in between. In 2015 [1,49/2,99] 
the quick ratio declined only to rise in 2015 [1,53/3,06] and then fall again in the 
subsequent year [1,11/2,22]. 
Profitability: Although the profitability fell in the first three years from [ROA: 
9,93/4,99; ROE: 15,4/5,90] in 2014 to [ROA: 7,05/4,51; ROE: 12,7/5,44], the negative 
development may have not caused too much concerns, as the ratios remained on roughly 
the same level. However, the EWS framework shows that this was the beginning of a 
negative spiral as the profitability turned negative in 2017 [ROA: -1,21/3,13; ROE: -2,39/ 
3,93] and remained below zero for the following year [ROA: -1,01/3,15; ROE: -2,30/ 
3,95]. Consequently, the fall in profitability already hinted at a looming crisis situation.  
Discriminant and logit analysis: The substantial decline in the Z-score from 
[9,66/9,66] in 2014 to [7,58/7,58] in 2015 already implied that there were underlying 
issues within Under Armour. Since the Z-score further fell in the following three years 
from [5,21/5,21] in 2016 to [3,12/3,12] in 2017 and [3,11/3,11] in 2018, the crisis could 
have been foreseen. The logit model indicates a turnaround situation in 2017 
[52,6%/5,26] which further deteriorated in 2018 [38,4%/3,84]. In the previous three 
years, the logistic regression never showed a lower probability of financial health than 
97,2% in 2014 [97,2%/9,72].    
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In the Under Armour case, the strategy crisis transitioned to an earnings crisis in 
2017. Due to the drastic decrease in net income, the company management supposedly 
realized the presence of the crisis in this year. This assumption is reinforced by the 
subsequent stock price increase, which may indicate that the market feels that the crisis 
is being tackled accordingly. However, the further declining Z-score and logistic 
regression result show an opposing picture. According to the increasingly negative 
development of the discriminant and logit analysis scores, it can be argued that the crisis 
could only be calmed at best.  
Overall, the last case study of Under Armour serves as a prime example of the 
predictive capabilities of the proposed EWS framework. Not only did the fall in 
profitability and Z-value indicate the corporate decline three fiscal periods prior to a 
turnaround situation becoming apparent, the negative development already raised red 
flags while the stock price was still increasing. Consequently, the Under Armour case 
further reinforces the proposed hypothesis that potential organizational crises are 
predictable. Furthermore, it also shows that it is an important management task to be 
aware of looming crises, even during periods of excessive growth.  
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5 Conclusion 
In the following chapter, the aforementioned findings of the EWS application to 
several case studies will be addressed, in regard to the proposed research hypothesis. First, 
it will be evaluated to what extent turnaround situations are predictable and whether the 
EWS framework facilitates their early recognition. The discussion of the case study 
findings will yield in a condensed conceptual framework that facilitates its application. 
Subsequently, the limitations of the framework are highlighted in order to identify areas 
of future research. The transparency regarding the limitations of the framework, further 
contributes to the understanding of its predictive abilities. Finally, the framework’s 
limitations and areas for future research are highlighted.  
5.1 Are Turnaround Situations Predictable? 
The application of the EWS framework yielded clear results regarding the 
predictability of crisis situations. On average, the application of the EWS framework was 
able to predict looming organizational crises 2,25 years prior to their occurrence. In five 
out of eight cases, crisis symptoms were already visible two or more years prior to either 
the liquidity being affected, or the crisis situation being recognized. In the Rolls-Royce 
example, the signs should have already caused serious concerns six years prior to the 
crisis, whereas the General Electric case showed that the crisis could have been 
recognized four years earlier. In both these cases, as well as in the Under Armour 
example, the rising stock price indicated that the overall perception of the company was 
still positive during a period where red flags were clearly visible. Both the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and the Starbucks case reinforced the notion that crises are more easily rectified, 
if they are recognized earlier. Rieter, on the other hand, demonstrated that, if a turnaround 
is not sustainable, the company will fall into another crisis in the foreseeable future. In 
both, the Rieter and the Starbucks case, the signs have to some extent been rather 
ambiguous. While the Starbucks example showed that the company’s strategy may 
complicate the early recognition of crises, Rieter demonstrated that ambiguous results 
always require further investigation. In general, the case studies have clearly shown that 
turnaround situations, as implied by a fall in the logit score, are predictable. In nearly all 
of the cases, the symptoms were evident before a turnaround situation was apparent. The 
first indicators of the looming decay are often a decline in the Z-value followed by 
negative changes in the organizational profitability. The cash flow to debt ratio was in 
some cases more, and in others less meaningful. Overall, neither the activity, leverage nor 
liquidity ratios were able to unambiguously indicate a negative trend development. 
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The fact that the framework was able to predict corporate crises in nearly all of 
the examples, shows the cross-industry capabilities of the proposed EWS model. 
Consequently, it can be assumed that, even with taking industry-specific indicators into 
account, the framework will allow for the early recognition of crisis situations in most 
cases. Furthermore, since the framework was able to predict crises while the stock price 
was still rising, it can be demonstrated that crises can be recognized even before the 
market perception changes. 
As shown by the General Electric and Starbucks example, the management of a 
company is able to prevent major corporate turnarounds, if the crises are recognized in 
early stages. This finding directly answers the second part of the hypothesis and leads to 
the assumption that all turnarounds are preventable, if they are predictable. This is due to 
the fact that the company has less time pressure and more action alternatives if the crises 
are identified early. Furthermore, the EWS allow managers to launch an extensive internal 
investigation to uncover the underlying issues, which may be impossible, if the crisis is 
recognized late, due to the increasing pressure for action. Furthermore, the intrinsic 
knowledge of the company, enables managers to initiate corrective measures once the 
crisis is acknowledged.  
5.2 Conceptual Framework for the Early Recognition of Crises 
The proposed conceptual framework is condensed to the most indicative factors. 
As aforementioned, the Z-score, the coverage ratio and the profitability ratios signaled 
the looming crisis reliably. Furthermore, the logit score is also included in the new 
framework, because of its importance in defining the existence of a turnaround situation. 
As a result, the radar chart can be simplified, which facilitates the interpretation of the 
results.  
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5.3 Limitations 
5.3.1 Quantitative Analysis  
As already addressed in the theoretical framework, the nature of the analysis 
employed is subject to the validity of publicly available financial statements. Since the 
annual reports only show the specific performance and the end of the fiscal years, the 
predictive abilities of the framework may be restricted. Furthermore, it is argued that, 
were the scores monitored on a more regular basis, the organizational decline could be 
recognized at even earlier stages. This assumption is based on the findings in the case 
studies which often revealed a quick deterioration from one year to another, rather than a 
slow progressive decline. In addition, due to the dependence on financial data, the cases 
were restricted to public companies. Therefore, solely based on this paper, the predictive 
abilities of the framework for private companies can only be anticipated, but not 
confirmed. Moreover, the framework does not indicate why the analyzed scores are 
changing, which would require further analysis of the financial statements, 
macroeconomic- and company-specific factors. However, the focus is on predicting 
turnaround situations, such an analysis would have gone beyond the scope of this paper. 
Furthermore, a detailed cause analysis is closely linked to qualitative, company-specific 
information, which is extremely difficult to obtain. By not being able to determine the 
root causes, the framework can neither indicate how the crisis could be overcome.  
5.3.2 Qualitative Analysis 
Although, the analysis of qualitative factors is the basis to determine the root 
causes of an organizational crisis, this thesis has not included such aspects in the proposed 
framework. First, it is argued that, due to the unique, company-specific factors 
contributing to the organizational decay, a thorough qualitative analysis of the case 
studies would have exceeded the scope of this thesis. Second, since such analyses require 
industry-, or company-specific experience, combined with the unrestricted access to 
internal information, an extensive qualitative assessment of the evaluated cases was 
impossible. Third, based on the specific intrinsic knowledge of managers, it is argued that 
they are better suited to determine the cause of specific crises, that a research-based 
framework would be. Furthermore, such an analysis would have immensely restricted the 
available case studies and would have prevented the evaluation of the cross-industry 
characteristics. Consequently, by not including a qualitative analysis, the proposed 
framework is limited in its ability to predict the causes of the crisis situations. 
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5.3.3 Other Limitations 
For simplicity reasons, this paper assumes that all crises that are predictable are 
preventable. However, in reality, this is not necessarily the case. Cognitive errors, 
misleading forecasts, miscommunication or an adverse organizational culture could all be 
possible factors why this assumption may not be correct. However, since the influence of 
such factors would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis, this assumption is necessary 
in order to answer the hypothesis.  
Furthermore, industry-specific factors have not been taken into consideration. The 
inclusion of such factors which could further advance the predictive abilities regarding 
specific industries. However, as the primary goal was to evaluate the cross-industry 
applicability of the framework, such an analysis would have exceeded the scope of this 
paper. 
The thesis does not address the prediction of crises that are due to unforeseeable 
events or fraudulent behavior as this should be part of a company’s risk management, 
rather than crisis prediction.  
Finally, all the cases have been analyzed retrospectively, which arguably makes 
it easier to determine negative trends. Consequently, it could be argued that while the 
developments seem obvious in past cases, the application of the framework in real time, 
would not yield similarly clear results. Therefore, the capabilities of the conceptual EWS 
model, when applied in practice, would need to be verified. Nonetheless, due the clear 
results of the analysis conducted in this thesis, a successful transition to corporate 
application can be expected. In addition, since up-to-date figures could be used, the 
predictive abilities are even expected to increase. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Studies 
Future studies would add value to the existing framework by analyzing industry-
specific boundaries for each of the decisive framework measurements. By doing so, the 
interpretation of the results will be facilitated, and more meaningful scales could be 
established. Therefore, the illustration in the radar scales can be optimized. Furthermore, 
future research could focus on the inclusion of qualitative factors in an EWS framework, 
which would not only allow the recognition of crises at an earlier stage, but it would also 
contribute to the cause-analysis of the organizational decline. 
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Appendix I: Financial Ratios for Business Failure Prediction 
Table 5: Financial Ratios for Business Failure Prediction 
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X      X    X    
CA to TA     X          
Cash ratio           X    
CF to debt  X X  X    X    X  
CF to TA     X     X     
CF to sales     X  X        
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CL to TA              X 
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CL to sales     X          
Current ratio  X  X     X  X  X X 
D/E ratio    X        X   
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FA to equity    X           
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ratio 
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Inventory 
turnover 
   X2       X    
Inventories 
to WC 
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1 As cited in Lin, Linag & Chen (2011) 
2 Used two alternative measures for inventory turnover 
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Long-term 
debt to WC 
   X           
MV of 
equity to BV 
of debt 
X      X  X      
Net income 
to gross 
profit ratio 
             X 
No-credit 
interval 
 X             
Profit 
margin 
   X       X    
Quick assets 
to sales 
    X          
Quick assets 
to TA 
    X          
Quick ratio    X       X   X 
RE to TA X     X  X       
Return on 
WC 
   X           
Return on 
FA 
   X           
ROA  X  X X   X  X   X X 
ROE    X       X X  X 
ROI            X   
ROTA X      X        
Sales to 
equity 
   X           
TIE ratio    X       X    
WC to net 
worth 
             X 
WC to TA X X      X       
WC to sales  X  X X    X X     
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7.2 Appendix II: Scale Determinants 
Table 6: Scale Determinants 
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7.3 Appendix III: Analysis Alpiq 
 
Figure 22: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Alpiq 
 
Table 7: EWS Values Alpiq 
 
Notes: Working capital turnover for 2001 has been manually overridden because the value was outside of 
the established scale. ROE for 2012 and 2011 have been manually overridden because the values were 
outside of the established scale.  
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital turnover
Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Working capital turnover 6,17 6,10 5,78 5,93 6,04 5,84 7,69 10,00 8,79 7,09 7,38
Cash flow to debt ratio 2,39 2,76 2,58 2,85 2,79 2,89 2,68 2,69 2,77 2,93 3,02
Debt ratio 6,23 5,93 5,98 5,81 5,98 6,02 5,70 5,98 6,14 5,96 5,75
Current ratio 2,66 2,80 3,25 3,40 3,31 3,41 2,54 2,06 2,38 2,65 2,60
Quick ratio 2,60 2,76 3,19 3,33 3,25 3,35 2,50 2,01 2,32 2,59 2,55
ROA 3,22 3,20 3,83 2,01 2,07 3,34 2,11 2,05 3,92 3,89 4,49
ROE 3,07 2,98 4,59 -0,44 0,14 3,34 0,00 0,00 4,72 4,75 6,52
Z-Score 0,65 0,85 0,96 0,69 0,77 1,16 1,00 0,98 1,81 1,83 3,07
Logit Model 7,91 5,55 8,09 0,10 0,18 4,63 0,27 1,14 9,67 9,26 9,79
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Table 8: Financial Data Alpiq (adapted from Alpiq 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018 & 2019) 
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Table 9: Ratio Analysis Alpiq 
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7.4 Appendix IV: Analysis BlackBerry 
 
Figure 23: EWS Framework Complete Timespan BlackBerry 
Table 10: EWS Values BlackBerry (Part 1) 
 
Table 11: EWS Values BlackBerry (Part 2) 
 
Notes: Quick and current ratio for 2018 and 2004 have been manually overridden because the values were 
outside of the established scale. ROE and ROA for 2017 and 2014 have been manually overridden because 
the values were outside of the established scale. Z-score for 2014, 2010, 2009, 2009, 2007, 2006 and 2004 
have been manually overridden because the values were outside of the established scale.  
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital turnover
Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
Working capital turnover 5,09 5,24 5,22 5,24 5,49 5,61 6,01 6,03
Cash flow to debt ratio 5,26 1,57 3,05 3,80 2,30 5,61 6,51 7,59
Debt ratio 7,75 7,54 7,20 6,83 6,53 8,12 8,24 7,96
Current ratio 10,00 5,58 5,80 6,11 4,46 4,12 4,16 4,13
Quick ratio 10,00 5,50 5,52 5,94 4,24 3,77 3,56 3,79
ROA 5,12 0,00 2,71 2,56 0,00 2,52 4,75 7,75
ROE 6,03 0,00 2,25 1,86 0,00 2,20 5,25 9,69
Z-Score 3,10 2,63 1,91 2,06 0,00 2,33 3,96 5,13
Logit Model 0,64 0,00 0,34 0,04 0,00 5,94 9,99 10,00
Radar Chart
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Working capital turnover 5,88 5,81 5,60 5,44 5,42 5,30 5,10
Cash flow to debt ratio 8,33 5,76 7,50 8,58 4,89 4,68 3,98
Debt ratio 8,30 8,17 8,09 8,69 9,10 8,38 9,26
Current ratio 4,78 4,58 4,72 7,02 9,02 4,90 10,00
Quick ratio 4,27 3,93 4,18 6,09 8,05 4,60 10,00
ROA 7,35 7,23 7,25 6,74 6,09 4,69 3,78
ROE 8,72 8,70 8,82 7,57 6,52 5,13 3,84
Z-Score 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 5,30 10,00
Logit Model 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 9,98 9,99 0,03
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 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
Table 12: Financial Data BlackBerry (adapted from Research in Motion 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014; BlackBerry 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019) 
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Table 13: Ratio Analysis BlackBerry 
 
20
18
20
17
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
A
ct
iv
ity
 r
at
io
s
W
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l t
ur
no
ve
r
0,
44
72
16
89
1
1,
20
64
51
61
3
1,
09
53
34
68
6
1,
18
93
72
32
5
2,
44
28
11
04
3
3,
03
12
07
22
7
5,
02
72
70
24
8
5,
15
99
27
42
4
4,
42
28
80
55
9
4,
05
87
79
23
2
3,
00
03
12
54
3
2,
21
25
19
2
2,
11
25
34
1
1,
47
84
28
7
0,
51
86
22
3
C
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
s
Ca
sh
 fl
ow
 to
 d
eb
t r
at
io
0,
55
21
56
86
3
-0
,1
85
73
79
77
0,
11
04
90
11
2
0,
26
07
44
06
7
-0
,0
40
48
89
23
0,
62
15
92
44
3
0,
80
19
82
92
5
1,
01
82
88
03
7
1,
16
64
75
89
7
0,
65
18
57
18
3
0,
99
94
53
60
8
1,
21
50
8
0,
47
89
28
7
0,
43
61
74
7
0,
29
67
48
3
Le
ve
ra
ge
 r
at
io
s
D
eb
t r
at
io
0,
33
73
01
58
7
0,
36
95
98
52
9
0,
42
03
10
80
6
0,
47
61
03
22
2
0,
51
99
94
70
3
0,
28
14
28
02
9
0,
26
44
38
13
3
0,
30
57
86
40
8
0,
25
49
62
92
8
0,
27
49
21
82
8
0,
28
62
57
93
3
0,
19
60
04
9
0,
13
55
39
7
0,
24
31
58
9
0,
11
13
79
Li
qu
id
ity
 r
at
io
s
Cu
rre
nt
 ra
tio
5,
49
13
79
31
2,
79
04
29
04
3
2,
89
79
78
82
6
3,
05
72
26
70
6
2,
22
97
17
81
3
2,
05
94
54
75
6
2,
08
20
30
09
7
2,
06
28
09
91
7
2,
39
02
91
54
4
2,
28
87
86
11
6
2,
35
84
37
93
3
3,
51
14
39
4
4,
50
90
39
2,
44
80
24
3
6,
48
90
72
4
Q
ui
ck
 ra
tio
5,
48
49
13
79
3
2,
74
75
24
75
2
2,
76
03
46
48
7
2,
96
77
18
26
9
2,
12
21
34
03
9
1,
88
45
70
76
6
1,
77
89
90
85
3
1,
89
25
61
98
3
2,
13
46
71
47
7
1,
96
61
91
89
9
2,
08
96
78
66
2
3,
04
32
38
3
4,
02
63
24
1
2,
30
14
05
8
6,
28
39
92
8
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
ra
tio
s
RO
A
 (i
n 
pe
rc
en
t)
10
,7
14
28
57
1
-3
6,
95
98
52
9
-3
,7
58
58
33
03
-4
,6
41
93
00
66
-7
7,
76
74
78
81
-4
,9
06
95
02
47
8,
47
71
68
45
1
26
,4
93
20
38
8
24
,0
79
23
86
9
23
,3
61
67
25
7
23
,4
77
10
21
2
20
,4
46
17
8
16
,5
24
75
8,
14
14
53
2
2,
68
35
24
4
RO
E 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
)
16
,1
67
66
46
7
-5
8,
62
90
71
46
-6
,4
83
79
05
24
-8
,8
60
39
05
57
-1
62
,0
13
79
31
-6
,8
28
75
26
43
11
,5
24
75
24
8
38
,1
62
89
99
8
32
,3
19
51
75
2
32
,2
19
52
26
3
32
,8
92
97
80
3
25
,4
30
72
3
19
,1
15
68
5
10
,7
57
15
3,
01
98
75
2
Z-
Sc
or
e
Z
3,
09
98
23
58
4
2,
62
87
77
96
6
1,
90
87
62
15
4
2,
06
23
38
93
4
-0
,5
57
15
08
75
2,
33
19
80
64
3
3,
95
87
45
08
7
5,
13
07
50
15
11
,9
57
75
82
1
14
,8
00
38
52
3
12
,4
86
21
78
6
25
,4
54
09
3
19
,0
35
77
6
5,
30
25
68
1
14
,4
72
60
3
X
1
0,
55
13
22
75
1
0,
33
25
16
08
9
0,
35
63
42
60
9
0,
42
81
56
97
1
0,
36
93
06
14
4
0,
27
74
78
16
2
0,
26
70
59
93
7
0,
29
96
50
48
5
0,
33
13
15
51
3
0,
33
65
15
22
2
0,
36
34
28
60
4
0,
44
43
87
4
0,
42
29
38
2
0,
34
85
06
7
0,
59
36
33
1
X
2
-0
,0
11
90
47
6
-0
,1
34
23
23
02
0,
13
87
78
46
0,
15
42
22
01
9
0,
18
45
86
86
4
0,
55
19
93
92
3
0,
57
62
87
23
3
0,
52
41
94
17
5
0,
51
68
71
18
8
0,
43
76
67
84
2
0,
29
99
52
44
2
0,
11
62
94
2
0,
06
40
21
6
0,
03
59
33
3
-0
,0
61
72
1
X
3
0,
07
48
67
72
5
-0
,3
61
93
68
68
-0
,0
40
29
63
5
-0
,0
64
59
00
14
-0
,9
48
49
04
66
-0
,0
93
80
93
43
0,
10
85
13
58
2
0,
36
00
77
67
0,
31
73
01
08
0,
33
60
04
32
1
0,
31
41
17
26
7
0,
26
11
98
2
0,
18
15
79
0,
01
29
92
8
0,
01
91
69
2
X
4
2,
97
16
34
25
9
4,
86
50
16
62
5
1,
55
98
85
92
9
1,
57
05
28
39
1,
46
83
84
17
1
1,
05
25
64
21
1
1,
71
33
23
84
2
1,
97
40
40
38
6
12
,6
12
26
88
2
17
,1
35
11
62
5
14
,3
98
76
32
3
34
,7
16
43
4
25
,6
75
66
4
6,
47
86
89
2
20
,4
17
45
8
X
5
0,
24
65
60
84
7
0,
40
11
64
57
2
0,
39
03
14
42
0,
50
92
38
05
2
0,
90
21
45
12
7
0,
84
10
93
80
9
1,
34
25
82
47
8
1,
54
61
74
75
7
1,
46
53
68
94
1,
36
58
40
99
6
1,
09
03
99
4
0,
98
32
15
7
0,
89
34
71
3
0,
51
52
42
3
0,
30
78
71
4
Lo
gi
t M
od
el
F
6,
36
88
6%
0,
00
00
0%
3,
43
12
6%
0,
37
81
2%
0,
00
00
0%
59
,4
08
70
%
99
,9
08
99
%
99
,9
99
96
%
99
,9
99
87
%
99
,9
99
86
%
99
,9
99
85
%
99
,9
96
68
%
99
,8
11
12
%
99
,8
60
38
%
0,
31
87
0%
X
1
0,
17
72
48
67
7
0,
18
90
89
79
5
0,
17
00
39
75
4
0,
24
49
22
88
9
-0
,0
05
69
38
56
0,
26
08
43
14
5
0,
47
91
34
80
4
0,
68
54
36
89
3
0,
64
53
05
18
1
0,
62
91
89
47
6
0,
55
89
68
69
4
0,
53
66
88
0,
49
33
18
8
0,
27
26
19
1
0,
14
04
44
3
X
2
0,
10
71
42
85
7
-0
,3
69
59
85
29
-0
,0
37
58
58
33
-0
,0
46
41
93
01
-0
,7
77
67
47
88
-0
,0
49
06
95
02
0,
08
47
71
68
5
0,
26
49
32
03
9
0,
24
07
92
38
7
0,
23
36
16
72
6
0,
23
47
71
02
1
0,
20
44
61
8
0,
16
52
47
5
0,
08
14
14
5
0,
02
68
35
2
X
3
5,
48
49
13
79
3
2,
74
75
24
75
2
2,
76
03
46
48
7
2,
96
77
18
26
9
2,
12
21
34
03
9
1,
88
45
70
76
6
1,
77
89
90
85
3
1,
89
25
61
98
3
2,
13
46
71
47
7
1,
96
61
91
89
9
2,
08
96
78
66
2
3,
04
32
38
3
4,
02
63
24
1
2,
30
14
05
8
6,
28
39
92
8
X
4
0,
33
73
01
58
7
0,
36
95
98
52
9
0,
42
03
10
80
6
0,
47
61
03
22
2
0,
51
99
94
70
3
0,
28
14
28
02
9
0,
26
44
38
13
3
0,
30
57
86
40
8
0,
25
49
62
92
8
0,
27
49
21
82
8
0,
28
62
57
93
3
0,
19
60
04
9
0,
13
55
39
7
0,
24
31
58
9
0,
11
13
79
X
5
2,
03
32
79
22
1
1,
30
85
24
17
3
1,
27
15
02
18
1,
44
03
86
23
1,
45
29
05
81
2
1,
56
00
26
38
5
1,
51
31
08
61
4
1,
65
91
79
50
6
1,
73
11
22
62
9
1,
80
19
98
04
5
1,
93
40
65
38
3
2,
12
32
23
1,
89
35
30
3
1,
84
22
87
8
2,
97
97
62
9
O
th
er
 r
at
io
s
To
ta
l m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
3 
78
9
$ 
   
   
   
5 
86
7
$ 
   
   
   
 
3 
62
8
$ 
   
   
   
 
4 
89
7
$ 
   
   
   
 
5 
76
6
$ 
   
   
   
  
3 
90
0
$ 
   
   
   
  
6 
22
1
$ 
   
   
   
  
7 
77
2
$ 
   
   
   
  
32
 8
14
$ 
   
   
   
38
 1
64
$ 
   
   
   
22
 7
16
$ 
   
   
   
21
 0
19
$ 
   
8 
04
6
$ 
   
  
4 
12
9
$ 
   
  
4 
39
2
$ 
   
  
W
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l
2 
08
4
$ 
   
   
   
1 
08
5
$ 
   
   
   
 
1 
97
2
$ 
   
   
   
 
2 
80
4
$ 
   
   
   
 
2 
78
9
$ 
   
   
   
  
3 
65
3
$ 
   
   
   
  
3 
66
7
$ 
   
   
   
  
3 
85
8
$ 
   
   
   
  
3 
38
1
$ 
   
   
   
  
2 
72
6
$ 
   
   
   
  
2 
00
3
$ 
   
   
   
  
1 
37
3
$ 
   
  
97
8
$ 
   
   
  
91
3
$ 
   
   
  
1 
14
7
$ 
   
  
e
2,
71
82
8
 79 
 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
7.5 Appendix V: Analysis Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 
Figure 24: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Table 14: EWS Values Bristol-Myers Squibb (Part 1) 
 
Table 15: EWS Values Bristol-Myers Squibb (Part 2) 
 
Notes: ROE for 2009, 2008, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997 have been manually overridden because the values 
were outside of the established scale.  
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Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
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2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
Radar Chart
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Working capital turnover 7,84 5,56 5,60 5,49 5,51 7,27 5,94 5,71
Cash flow to debt ratio 4,06 3,91 3,95 3,75 3,57 3,51 3,17 3,04
Debt ratio 5,87 6,54 6,69 6,51 6,09 6,02 5,94 5,99
Current ratio 2,30 3,94 3,94 4,42 4,40 2,39 3,17 3,57
Quick ratio 1,90 3,58 3,58 3,97 3,87 1,89 2,53 2,97
ROA 4,24 5,21 5,00 9,04 6,29 4,71 4,37 5,11
ROE 5,73 7,21 6,62 10,00 10,00 6,75 5,98 7,79
Z-Score 3,38 4,89 4,45 4,40 3,94 3,77 3,69 3,52
Logit Model 9,58 9,90 9,87 10,00 9,99 9,87 9,03 9,83
Radar Chart
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
Working capital turnover 5,78 5,82 7,06 6,10 5,87 6,08 6,22 6,24
Cash flow to debt ratio 3,28 3,49 2,80 4,15 5,27 5,14 4,87 4,10
Debt ratio 5,57 5,71 5,74 5,98 6,81 6,70 6,44 6,55
Current ratio 3,01 3,22 2,43 2,80 3,49 3,35 3,03 3,07
Quick ratio 2,64 2,79 2,04 2,46 2,84 2,58 2,39 2,36
ROA 4,64 5,22 4,70 4,89 7,22 7,39 6,55 6,90
ROE 7,23 8,62 7,11 7,26 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00
Z-Score 3,15 3,59 3,22 4,42 9,47 8,66 8,18 7,19
Logit Model 9,07 9,82 9,72 9,80 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00
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Table 16: Financial Data Bristol-Myers Squibb (adapted from Bristol-Myers Squibb 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 & 2013) 
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7.6 Appendix VI: Analysis General Electric 
 
Figure 25: EWS Framework Complete Timespan General Electric 
 
Table 18: EWS Values General Electric 
 
Notes: ROE for 2018 has been manually overridden because the value was outside of the established scale. 
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital turnover
Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
Working capital turnover 5,41 5,36 5,34 5,36 5,10 5,10 5,10 5,11 5,10
Cash flow to debt ratio 2,58 2,68 2,50 2,76 2,77 2,77 2,78 2,78 2,79
Debt ratio 4,45 4,84 4,80 4,73 4,74 4,72 4,58 4,43 4,44
Current ratio 3,91 3,74 3,77 3,25 7,14 6,86 5,89 5,01 5,92
Quick ratio 3,29 3,18 3,23 2,82 6,83 6,58 5,67 4,85 5,77
ROA 2,12 3,07 3,72 3,14 3,73 3,67 3,67 3,67 3,60
ROE 0,00 2,10 5,17 2,37 5,20 4,96 5,13 5,37 4,97
Z-Score 1,05 1,30 1,88 1,37 1,58 1,58 1,40 1,30 1,27
Logit Model 0,00 0,29 1,59 0,50 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,06 0,01
 83 
 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
Table 19: Financial Data General Electric (adapted from General Electric 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019) 
 
Notes: All figures in Million US$ expect per share data / Net cash flow includes exchange rate effects / 
Stock price information for 2017 and 2018 from Macrotrends (n.d.c) / Redeemable noncontrolling interests 
is not included in total equity figure. Same for 2016, 2017 and 2018  
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Table 20: Ratio Analysis General Electric 
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7.7 Appendix VII: Analysis Rieter 
 
Figure 26: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Rieter 
 
Table 21: EWS Values Rieter 
 
Notes: ROE for 2009 has been manually overridden because the value was outside of the established scale. 
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital turnover
Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Working capital turnover 5,84 5,70 5,54 5,64 5,76 5,61 5,44 5,46 6,35 7,32 7,67
Cash flow to debt ratio 3,21 2,67 3,45 3,30 3,08 3,24 2,57 3,06 2,90 2,49 2,71
Debt ratio 6,30 6,24 6,41 6,29 5,77 5,67 5,68 5,66 5,46 5,74 6,43
Current ratio 3,60 3,70 4,29 4,12 3,16 3,68 4,66 4,88 2,98 2,44 2,51
Quick ratio 2,44 2,51 3,22 2,87 2,19 2,53 3,16 3,43 2,14 1,74 1,73
ROA 3,87 3,54 4,05 4,16 4,06 3,89 3,75 5,12 3,69 1,34 0,17
ROE 4,53 3,82 4,88 5,20 5,33 4,93 4,51 8,56 4,44 0,00 0,00
Z-Score 2,21 2,60 2,54 2,68 2,13 2,34 2,09 2,39 2,48 1,43 1,18
Logit Model 9,66 8,96 9,50 9,72 9,63 8,92 6,80 9,86 7,65 0,10 0,00
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Table 22: Financial Data Rieter (adapted from Rieter 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018 & 2019) 
  B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
20
18
20
17
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
N
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s
42
4,
5
CH
F 
   
   
 
45
0,
0
CH
F 
   
   
 
34
4,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
37
0,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
38
7,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
37
1,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
35
6,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
32
2,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
80
2,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
88
6,
5
CH
F 
   
   
 
92
9,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s
18
6,
6
CH
F 
   
   
 
19
2,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
16
3,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
19
1,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
 
25
3,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
23
3,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
22
9,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
23
4,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
 
32
8,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
26
6,
0
CH
F 
   
   
 
36
1,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
Cu
rr
en
t a
ss
et
s
57
7,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
59
8,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
65
3,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
63
1,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
82
2,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
74
2,
9
C
H
F 
   
   
 
71
3,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
 
78
9,
4
C
H
F 
   
   
 
1 
16
6,
9
CH
F 
   
 
92
7,
6
CH
F 
   
   
 
1 
15
9,
6
CH
F 
   
 
To
ta
l a
ss
et
s
1 
00
2,
3
C
H
F 
   
1 
04
8,
2
C
H
F 
   
99
8,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
1 
00
1,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
20
9,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
11
4,
0
C
H
F 
   
1 
07
0,
1
C
H
F 
   
1 
11
1,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
96
9,
1
C
H
F 
   
1 
81
4,
1
C
H
F 
   
2 
08
8,
9
C
H
F 
   
N
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s
23
5,
1
CH
F 
   
   
 
26
7,
5
CH
F 
   
   
 
23
2,
5
CH
F 
   
   
 
25
1,
4
C
H
F 
   
   
 
24
7,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
 
32
1,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
38
6,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
 
40
0,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
55
7,
1
CH
F 
   
   
 
39
9,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
41
8,
9
CH
F 
   
   
 
Cu
rr
en
t l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s
32
0,
6
CH
F 
   
   
 
32
3,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
30
4,
9
CH
F 
   
   
 
30
6,
2
C
H
F 
   
   
 
52
0,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
40
3,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
30
6,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
 
32
3,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
 
78
4,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
75
9,
0
CH
F 
   
   
 
92
3,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
To
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s
55
5,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
59
0,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
53
7,
4
C
H
F 
   
   
55
7,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
76
7,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
72
4,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
69
3,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
72
3,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
1 
34
1,
5
C
H
F 
   
1 
15
8,
3
C
H
F 
   
1 
34
2,
7
C
H
F 
   
Re
ta
in
ed
 e
ar
ni
ng
s /
 R
es
er
ve
s
To
ta
l e
qu
ity
44
6,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
45
7,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
46
0,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
44
3,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
44
1,
9
C
H
F 
   
   
38
9,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
37
6,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
37
9,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
62
7,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
65
5,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
74
6,
2
C
H
F 
   
   
To
ta
l e
qu
ity
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s
1 
00
2,
3
C
H
F 
   
1 
04
8,
2
C
H
F 
   
99
8,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
1 
00
1,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
20
9,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
11
4,
0
C
H
F 
   
1 
07
0,
1
C
H
F 
   
1 
10
3,
0
C
H
F 
   
1 
96
9,
1
C
H
F 
   
1 
81
4,
1
C
H
F 
   
2 
08
8,
9
C
H
F 
   
In
co
m
e 
St
at
em
en
t
20
18
20
17
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
N
et
 R
ev
en
ue
/S
al
es
1 
07
5,
2
C
H
F 
   
96
5,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
94
5,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
1 
03
6,
8
C
H
F 
   
1 
14
3,
4
C
H
F 
   
1 
03
5,
3
C
H
F 
   
88
8,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
1 
06
0,
8
C
H
F 
   
2 
58
5,
8
C
H
F 
   
1 
95
6,
3
C
H
F 
   
3 
14
2,
5
C
H
F 
   
CO
G
S
96
6,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
86
6,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
81
9,
9
CH
F 
   
   
 
90
7,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
 
1 
02
5,
3
C
H
F 
   
 
96
1,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
 
82
6,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
 
89
6,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
2 
30
2,
7
CH
F 
   
 
1 
89
2,
2
CH
F 
   
 
2 
84
0,
6
CH
F 
   
 
G
ro
ss
 p
ro
fit
/E
BI
TD
A
10
8,
4
C
H
F 
   
   
99
,2
C
H
F 
   
   
  
12
5,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
12
9,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
11
8,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
73
,6
C
H
F 
   
   
  
61
,7
C
H
F 
   
   
  
16
4,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
28
3,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
64
,1
C
H
F 
   
   
  
30
1,
9
C
H
F 
   
   
EB
IT
43
,2
CH
F 
   
   
   
51
,8
CH
F 
   
   
   
56
,5
CH
F 
   
   
   
73
,1
C
H
F 
   
   
   
84
,6
C
H
F 
   
   
   
60
,0
C
H
F 
   
   
   
33
,6
C
H
F 
   
   
   
11
2,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
 
98
,0
CH
F 
   
   
   
-1
86
,6
CH
F 
   
  
-3
12
,1
CH
F 
   
  
N
et
 in
co
m
e
32
,0
C
H
F 
   
   
  
13
,3
C
H
F 
   
   
  
42
,7
C
H
F 
   
   
  
49
,8
C
H
F 
   
   
  
52
,9
C
H
F 
   
   
  
37
,4
C
H
F 
   
   
  
26
,5
C
H
F 
   
   
  
11
9,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
41
,6
C
H
F 
   
   
  
-2
17
,5
C
H
F 
   
  
-3
96
,7
C
H
F 
   
  
C
as
h 
Fl
ow
 S
ta
te
m
en
t
20
18
20
17
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
Ca
sh
 fl
ow
 fr
om
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
78
,4
CH
F 
   
   
   
20
,6
CH
F 
   
   
   
10
2,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
89
,0
C
H
F 
   
   
   
89
,6
C
H
F 
   
   
   
10
7,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
 
9,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
   
  
80
,4
C
H
F 
   
   
   
10
6,
1
CH
F 
   
   
 
-1
,6
CH
F 
   
   
   
57
,2
CH
F 
   
   
   
Ca
sh
 fl
ow
 fr
om
 in
ve
sti
ng
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
-2
5,
0
CH
F 
   
   
 
-1
21
,9
CH
F 
   
  
-2
5,
9
CH
F 
   
   
 
-7
,0
C
H
F 
   
   
   
-4
0,
5
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-4
6,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-4
1,
6
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-0
,9
C
H
F 
   
   
   
-9
2,
5
CH
F 
   
   
 
-3
3,
2
CH
F 
   
   
 
-3
5,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
Ca
sh
 fl
ow
 fr
om
 fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
-3
6,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
-1
9,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
-3
4,
4
CH
F 
   
   
 
-8
4,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-7
7,
3
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-4
0,
0
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-3
1,
8
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-2
5,
1
C
H
F 
   
   
 
12
9,
3
CH
F 
   
   
 
-2
7,
8
CH
F 
   
   
 
8,
8
CH
F 
   
   
   
  
N
et
 c
as
h 
flo
w
12
,9
C
H
F 
   
   
  
-1
22
,3
C
H
F 
   
  
39
,1
C
H
F 
   
   
  
-1
0,
4
C
H
F 
   
   
 
-2
3,
9
C
H
F 
   
   
 
18
,2
C
H
F 
   
   
  
-6
5,
7
C
H
F 
   
   
 
56
,4
C
H
F 
   
   
  
13
4,
2
C
H
F 
   
   
-6
4,
9
C
H
F 
   
   
 
25
,1
CH
F 
   
   
   
Sh
ar
e 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
20
18
20
17
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
Y
ea
r e
nd
 st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e
12
8,
8
23
7,
8
17
7,
1
18
8
16
5,
5
20
5,
6
15
9,
4
14
1,
1
33
9
23
3,
5
16
,4
27
4
A
ve
ra
ge
 sh
ar
es
 o
ut
sta
nd
in
g 
(in
 M
io
)
4,
51
48
46
4,
52
42
73
4,
51
58
61
4,
55
06
50
4,
58
39
09
4,
60
26
52
4,
60
97
78
4,
62
55
81
4,
64
02
20
4,
39
28
08
3,
82
29
29
N
ot
es
: A
ll 
fig
ur
es
 in
 M
ill
io
n 
CH
F 
ex
pe
ct
 p
er
 sh
ar
e 
da
ta
 / 
N
et
 c
as
h 
flo
w
 in
cl
ud
es
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 e
ff
ec
ts
 / 
St
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 S
ix
 G
ro
up
 (n
.d
.) 
 87 
 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
Table 23: Ratio Analysis Rieter 
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 Appendix} 
7.8 Appendix VIII: Analysis Rolls-Royce 
 
Figure 27: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Rolls-Royce 
 
Table 24: EWS Values Rolls-Royce 
 
Notes: Debt ratio for 2018 has been manually overridden because the value was outside of the established 
scale. ROE for 2018, 2017, 2016 ad 2009 has been manually overridden because the values were outside 
of the established scale.  
0,00
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4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
Working capital turnover
Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Working capital turnover 7,58 5,89 5,90 5,70 5,78 6,02 6,01 6,59 5,84 5,68
Cash flow to debt ratio 2,84 2,88 2,80 2,82 2,91 3,11 3,02 3,05 3,06 2,87
Debt ratio 3,11 4,70 3,82 4,83 5,25 5,16 5,58 5,17 4,97 4,97
Current ratio 2,16 2,67 2,70 2,96 2,91 2,62 2,67 2,40 2,74 2,97
Quick ratio 1,59 2,00 2,05 2,32 2,19 1,94 1,91 1,66 2,06 2,20
ROA 2,08 5,67 0,70 3,40 3,38 4,33 5,44 4,19 3,89 5,73
ROE 0,00 10,00 0,00 3,61 3,48 6,98 9,60 6,46 5,61 0,00
Z-Score 0,27 1,51 0,21 1,18 1,25 1,48 1,83 1,39 1,34 1,85
Logit Model 0,00 9,98 0,00 1,90 4,06 9,45 9,99 9,44 7,09 9,99
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Table 25: Financial Data Rolls-Royce 
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Table 26: Ratio Analysis Rolls-Royce (adapted from Rolls-Royce 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019) 
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 Preventing Corporate Turnarounds 
7.9 Appendix IX: Analysis Starbucks 
 
Figure 28: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Starbucks 
 
Table 27: EWS Values Starbucks 
 
Notes: Working capital turnover for 2005 has been manually overridden because the value was outside of 
the established scale.  
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Table 28: Financial Data Starbucks (adapted from Starbucks 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 & 2013) 
 
Notes: All figures in Million US$ expect per share data / Net cash flow includes exchange rate effects / 
Stock price information from Macrotrends (n.d.d)  
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Table 29: Ratio Analysis Starbucks 
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7.10 Appendix X: Analysis Under Armour 
 
Figure 29: EWS Framework Complete Timespan Under Armour 
 
Table 30: EWS Values Under Armour 
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Cash flow to debt ratio
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Quick ratioROA
ROE
Z-Score
Logit Model
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2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Radar Chart
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Working capital turnover 5,81 5,78 5,75 5,78 5,55 5,66 5,56 5,58 5,52 5,52
Cash flow to debt ratio 3,91 3,09 3,44 2,32 3,97 3,64 5,44 2,77 3,90 6,59
Debt ratio 6,50 6,69 7,05 7,21 7,63 7,78 8,04 7,95 8,24 8,22
Current ratio 3,94 4,41 5,73 6,26 7,35 5,29 7,16 7,51 7,45 7,46
Quick ratio 2,39 2,22 3,06 2,99 4,80 3,09 4,63 3,98 4,57 4,99
ROA 3,15 3,13 4,51 4,68 4,99 5,05 5,19 5,09 5,02 4,76
ROE 2,95 2,93 5,44 5,66 5,90 5,90 5,96 5,87 5,63 5,28
Z-Score 3,12 3,12 5,21 7,58 9,66 6,04 5,91 4,48 4,69 4,10
Logit Model 3,84 5,26 9,76 9,89 9,73 9,99 9,95 9,97 9,95 9,82
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Table 31: Financial Data Under Armour (adapted from Under Armour 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2105, 2106, 2017, 2018 & 2019) 
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Table 32: Ratio Analysis Under Armour 
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